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* ABSTRACT 
 
A Study on the Causality of the Great Merger Movement in the United 
States 
 
                                        By MOON, Bong-Seob 
                                        International Economic Policy 
                                        KDI School of 
                                        International Policy and Management  
 
 
So far there are four principal merger movements in American history. The first merger 
movement occurred from 1898 to 1902. The second large movements took place in the 
years 1926 through 1930. The third movement was occurred the decade following 
World War II. Finally, the fourth movement swept the United States since 1980s. 
The first merger movement of four merge movements was the most important of the 
major merger waves. It transformed many industries into those in which one or a few 
very large enterprises occupied leading positions. It laid the foundation for the industrial 
structure that has characterized most of American industry in the twentieth century. In 
that sense, the first movement is often called the Great Merger Movement. 
In the late nineteen century America saw high growth of manufacturing industry, 
development of cities, sharp expansion of population, and development of technology. 
At the same time, monopoly became widespread. The public, especially farmers hated 
monopoly due to the side-effects, and the opposition to trust became larger.  
Congress made the Sherman Act in 1890 to prevent trust and the Supreme Court 
presented its will in Knight, Trans-Missuri, Joint Traffic, and Addyston cases to 
prohibit monopoly. 
However, there are three principal theories on the causality of the Great Merger 
Movement: Retardation of industrial growth, development of railroad system, and 
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growth of capital market. These theories is proved not to have firm justification through 
my research. Rather, the main causality of the Great Merger Movement is proved to be 
judicial policy carried out preceding four principal cases. 
 
                                          1
I.  Introduction 
 
A.  Objectives of Study 
 
The presence is the continuation of the past. Recently American economy is booming, 
Dow Jones remarked over 10,000 points and unemployment rate is the lowest since 
World War II. At this point, I cannot raise question what is the potential to incur 
booming American economy and how American economy have been led. 
The booming economy in the United States dates back to the Great Merger Movement 
since the early twentieth century. There existed four the Great Merger movement in 
American history.  
The first recorded movement occurred as the United States entered the twenties century, 
its peak years being 1898 through 1902. In many respects it was the most important of 
the major merger waves. It transformed many industries, formerly characterized by 
many small and medium sized firms, into those in which one or a few very large 
enterprises occupied leading positions. It laid the foundation for the industrial structure 
that has characterized most of American industry in the twentieth century. 
The second large movement took place in the years 1926 through 1930. It reflected to 
some degree the emergence of new leading industries in the years since the first merger 
wave. It represented attempts to restore the industrial concentration achieved by the first 
merger wave, a concentration which had become diluted over the years. 
The third movement, a product of the decade following World War II, differs from the 
two earlier merger waves, having a lower peak and a wider spread of the post war 
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decade. The first years of its highest activity were 1946, 1947, and 1954, 1955, and 
1956.1 
The fourth wave swept the United States since 1980s. The size and intensity of this 
wave were also unprecedented. It was estimated that $1.2 trillion assets changed hands 
in the 1980’s alone. The Reagan government favored a market for corporate control 
such that antitrust laws were not enforced or removed. This less restrictive environment 
might have resulted in more mergers but less diversified mergers.2 
The reason the first merger movement is called the Great Merger Movement is that its 
influence was the deepest in respects size and effects to the economy. The twenties 
enterprises of 100 largest enterprises was founded during the Great Merger Movement 
age and other eight enterprises was the Court-ordered offspring of Standard Oil Trust 
which presented hints of “Corporate Revolution”.3 
My aim is to research what is the true causality of the Great Merger Movement, 
reviewing critically theories on the causality of the Great Merger Movement. To reach 
the persuasive conclusion, I will look for the background and atmosphere of the late 
nineteenth century as well as the whole aspect of the Great Merger Movement. 
Chapter 1 covers the objectives, scope and methods of study. Chapter 2 examines 
economic theories, motivation, and effect of the merger. Chapter 3 tries to present the 
contents and characteristics of American Antitrust laws like the Sherman Act and 
                                                          
1 Ralph L. Nelson, Merger Movements in American Industry 1895-1956 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1959), 5. 
2 Robert K. Su & Jong Kim, “Nature and Patterns of the New Merger Wave”, International Accounting 
Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (September, 1996), 79-80 ; on Korean merger activity see Stanley P. Wagner, 
“Antitrust, the Korean Experience 1981-85,” The Antitrust Bulletin (Summer 1987), 471-522. 
3 Alfreds Eichner, The Emergence of Oligopoly (New York: Greenwood Press, 1978), 15. 
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Clayton Act, including the function of Department of Justice and Fair Trade 
Commission. Chapter 4 covers the background, aspect, and characteristics of the Great 
Merger Movement. Chapter 5 reviews critically theories of causality of the Great 
Merger Movement and looks into whether judicial policy affected the Great Merger 
Movement. Chapter 6 as conclusion includes synopsis and limitation of study and 
suggests implications. 
 
B.  Scope and Methodos 
 
This study focuses upon the causality of the Great Merger Movement in the United 
States. The research includes only the first merger wave of four merger waves occurred 
in American history. Thus, I do not review merger movements following the first 
merger movement, let alone excluding contemporary merger movement.4 
In analyzing the causality of the Great Merger Movement I will make use of theoretical 
research. 
With the view of theoretical research, I shall use literature analysis method which 
analyses mainly American literature. The methodology is, at first, to present theories on 
the causality of the Great Merger Movement and measure these theories by statistical 
data. Then under hypothesis that judicial policy was one of causes of the Great Merger 
Movement, I will suggest some foundation to prove. When published books and data 
are too old to get them, I adapt them from second source. 
 
                                                          
4 On the merger activity of the early 1990s see Paul A. Pautler & Robert P. O’Quinn, “Recent Empirical 
                                          4
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Evidence on Mergers and Acquisition,” Antitrust Bulletin (Winter 1994), 741-98. 
                                          5
II.  General Theory of Merger 
 
A.  Motivation of Merger 
 
The motivation of merger is various and different from each merger type. However, the 
common motivations of diverse merger types are as follows.5 
 
   1. Efficiencies 
 
Firms may combine their operations through mergers and acquisitions of corporate 
assets to reduce production costs, improve product quality, or provide entirely new 
products. Among the potential efficiency benefits from mergers include both operating 
and managerial efficiencies. Operational efficiencies may arise from economies of 
scale6, production economies of scope7, consumption economies of scope8, improved 
resource allocation, improved use o information and expertise and reductions in 
transportation and transaction costs. It may be that mergers are the quickest or cheapest 
way to attain these benefits. The gains from mergers, however, are not limited to 
                                                          
5 Paul A. Pautler and Robert P. O’Quinn, “Recent Empirical Evidence on Mergers and Acquisition,” 
Antitrust Bulletin (Winter 1993), 742-7. 
6 Economies of scale refer to the long-run reduction in the per unit cost of making a product as the 
volume of production rises, allowing all inputs to be varied optimally. 
7 Production economies of scope refer to the reduction in overall costs from the joint production of 
complementary products. 
8 Consumption economies of scope refer to the increased consumer welfare from the joint consumption 
of complementary products. 
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operating efficiencies. The ability of one firm to merger with another firm or acquire its 
assets also creates a market for corporate control. Many economists consider an active 
market for corporate control an important safeguard against inefficient management. 
  
    2. Financial and Tax Benefits 
 
Merger may lead to financial efficiencies. For example, firms may diversify their 
earnings by acquiring other firms or their assets with dissimilar earnings streams. 
Earnings diversification within firms may lessen the variance in their profitability, 
reducing the risk of bankruptcy and its attendant costs. 
Mergers may also have certain tax benefits. First, a merging (“surviving”) firm may be 
able to carry over net operation losses and unused tax credits from the merged (“target”) 
firm. Second, the surviving firm may increase its depreciation allowances by revaluing 
the assets of the target firm.  
 
    3. Market Power Effects 
 
Some mergers may result in market power that redounds to the benefit of the merging 
firms. Especially, horizontal merger cannot help causing market power to somewhat 
degree according to definition of horizontal merger. The effect rests on market shares 
and market environment. 
Stigler argued that market power might have been a primary motivation for many of the 
mergers during the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first half of this century. 
He called the 1887-1904 merger wave “mergers to monopoly” and the 1916-1929 wave 
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“mergers to oligopoly.”9 
 
  4. Management Self-Aggrandizement 
 
The notion that managerial incentives may drive some mergers that ultimately reduce 
the long-run value of the firm. The managers may overdiversify, overemphasize growth, 
or simply make bad merger decisions. Managers who make poor merger increase the 
likelihood that they will become merger targets themselves. If so, the market for 
corporate control will tend to reduce the scope of self-aggrandizing behavior. 
 
B.  Theoretical Background of Merger 
 
Merger is that more than two enterprises convert into one-regulated enterprise 
through human and capital merger. Merger in general is classified by type of form, 
which includes horizontal merger, vertical merger, and conglomerate merger. 
Horizontal merger is defined as the integration of more than two competitive enterprises 
in the same market. Vertical merger is the integration of enterprises which exist in 
different level of production. In case an enterprise exists in the upstream industry, it is 
forward integration. On the contrary, suppose it exists in downstream industry it is 
backward industry. Conglomerate merger is merger among enterprises which have no 
transaction relationship or competitive one each other. Conglomerate merger covers 
product extension, market extension, and pure conglomerate. 
                                                          
9 G. Stigler, The Organization of Industry (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 
                                          8
 
 1. Horizontal Merger 
   a) Theoretical Background 
 
As horizontal merger leads directly to reduce the numbers of competitive enterprises, 
It causes in competitive-limit effect. Therefore, horizontal merger became main target 
of regulation policy. Horizontal merger, however, may lead cost-saving effect. For 
example, it can receive interest of scale in production, sale, human investment and R&D 
etc. following merger. The economic effect of horizontal merger rests on relative size of 
market power-enhancing effects and efficiency-enhancing effects.10 
There are three main theories presented by Stigler, Williamson, and Farrell & Shapiro. 
Stigler insisted that horizontal merger cause economic loss through monopolization. He 
said that the result of horizontal merger was monopolization due to extending market 
power under competition. For the purpose of this analysis, he suggested four 
unpromising assumptions: (1) long-run average and marginal cost of production are 
equal for firms of all relevant sizes; (2) entry of new firms is free, although not 
necessarily inexpensive; (3) the demand for the output of the industry is stable; (4) the 
specialized resources (“fixed factors”) employed in the industry are indestructible. He 
thought that the possibility of monopolization in horizontal merger, in reality, was high 
if assumptions were relaxed. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
100-7. 
10 Se-il Park, Law and Economics (Seoul: Bakyoungsa Press, 1995), 59. 
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Figure 1.  Explanation of Horizontal Merger by Stigler 
  P    AC   E      D       MC 
                                                             
   B                                                                     
                                                                                     
                MR          AR 
   O                                Q 
             C         A 
 
Suppose each firm will have the short-run cost curves displayed in Figure 2-1 and it will 
be operating at output OA, price OB, and making no profits. If all the firms are merged 
into monopoly and former fir now has a pro rata share of aggregate demand, AR, with 
corresponding marginal revenue, MR. Accordingly it operates at output OC and makes 
profits of OC times DE. Entry of new firms therefore takes place, and the pro rata 
demand curve of each plant in the merger now shifts to the left, price falls and profits 
diminish. Eventually the number of rivals will grow until the merger is reduced to the 
long-run equilibrium level of permanent loss, since the merger nor the new rivals can 
withdraw from the industry. However, as long as the new rivals cannot enter fast and 
can get excess profits for long time, there exists the possibility  that merger will 
happen. 
In case entry barriers are heightened or the demand is increased by changing 
assumptions (1) and (2), the company may get excess profits. If in assumption (4) fixed 
factors subtract, the company will have monopoly profit continuously by means of its 
continuous investment. Assumption (1) means that it reaches economy of scale and 
                                          10
companies prefer merger to internal expansion. In other words, if the scale of economy 
is small, the advantage of merger reduces. On the contrary, if economy of scale is large, 
monopolization is increased. Accordingly, there may be no company for merger.11 
On the contrary, Williamson maintains that economy of scales could be carried out , 
although horizontal merger causes monopoly.12 
 
Figure 2.  Explanation of Horizontal Merger by Williamson 
       P 
     P2        D    A1           
             A2              
     P1                                AC1                                            
                                       AC2 
      O                                  Q 
                 Q2      Q1 
AC1 is average cost prior to merger and AC2 is average cost following merger. P1 is 
the price prior to merger and P2 is the price following merger. He supposed that P2 is 
higher than P1, since the merger causes market power. The A1 and A2 represent the 
effect of merger. A1 is distributing loss which happens, since the price is increased from 
P1 to P2. The loss by increasing price is offset by cost-saving effect. In other words, 
Williamson thought that the price following merger is determined in the level of far 
beyond least average cost because the new firms may enter market. However, He did 
                                                          
11 Stigler, 95-100. ; Kyu-Hun Lee “ A Study of the Industry Policy and the Combination Regulations of 
Korea,” Master Thesis of Department of Economics, DanKook University, 1991. 
12 O. E. Williamson “Economics as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-Offs,” American Economic 
Review (March 1968), 18-26.  
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not consider X-inefficiency stemmed from expansion of firm size.  
Anyhow, these contentions shows that it is difficult to say in one word on the effect of 
horizontal merger and it needs flexible thought on regulation. In the process of ruling 
illegal merger case, the judges or rulers need strong theoretical foundations in the 
market delineation and entry analysis. I will discuss these two issues in the following 
paragraph. 
 
    b) Market Delineation 
 
The first step to determine market power-enhancing effects is to delineate market. Yet, 
there have been many contentions on the market delineation, since there has been no 
unmatched theory so far and therefore it has much room to delineate the market 
voluntarily. The firm expected having market power intends to lower market share, 
trying to delineate the market as wide as possible, whereas the competitors having less 
market power insist on existing of market power, trying to delineate the market 
narrowly.  
There exist some theories on the defining the market. One theory is on cross-elasticity 
of demand. According to this theory, market is defined as the binding of products with 
high elasticity of demand or market with high elasticity of demand. When the price of a 
product is increased, quantity of another product also is increased sharply, which means 
there exists high substitution between these two products. This therefore can be 
delineated as one market. The weakness of this theory, however, is not easy to measure 
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cross-elasticity of demand in real world.13 
 
    c) Entry Analysis 
 
There have been many theories on the entry analysis. Bain said that entry barrier was 
defined as the predominance of existing producer to potential entrant, which means that 
existing producer can set up higher price continuously than competitive price. Entry 
barrier covers exogenous sources like economy of scale and production differentiation. 
If this kind of entry barrier exists, antitrust policies focus upon preventing market 
structure from changing into increasing price by existing firms. 
Chicago schools challenged this entry barrier theory for the first time. 14  They 
differentiated “efficiency exclusion” and “improper exclusion”. Most of entry barriers 
conceived by limit-entry barrier theory are actually not entry barrier, since these are 
efficiency exclusion. At the same time, The actual entry barrier is diverse barriers by 
government intervention. 
According to contestability theory, entry can lead the competitive achievement if there 
is no sunk cost. In other words, if sunk cost is so little and entry is free, even monopoly 
cannot excess profits. This theory implies that regulation in contestable market is 
                                                          
13 Chun-Ku Lee, Micro Economics (Seoul: Pubmunsa Press, 1995), 457-8. 
14 Chicago schools in antitrust policy is defined as a group of economists who believe reasonable 
distribution of resources and efficiency is attained through market and government should not intervene 
market. Their viewpoints are that dynamic competition is important and the relationship of “structure-
conduct-performance” in industrial organization by Harvard schools is unacceptable for Chicago schools. 
Rather, under the logic of Chicago schools it is more important to increase efficiency and consumer 
welfare based upon inference from each case. 
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unnecessary.15 
  
      d) Analysis framework16 
 
The antitrust enforcement agency in the United States is Department of Justice (DOJ) 
and Fair Trade Commission (FTC). If antitrust enforcement agency announces the clear 
standard of ruling on the merger and corporate understand this standard clearly, the 
enforcement is more efficient. In these contexts, DOJ have announced its merger 
guideline since 1968. The first revision was in 1982 and another was in 1984. FTC also 
announced its regulation standard in cement, dairy and food distribution industry in 
1982. However, DOJ and FTC announced “Horizontal Merger Guidelines” in April 
1992. These guidelines included the development of legal and economic theories and 
tried to apply these developments into ruling in real cases. 
These guidelines present five analysis steps for ruling merger: 1) market definition, 
measure & concentration, 2) the potential adverse competition effects, 3) entry analysis, 
4) efficiencies, 5) failure and exiting assets. 
I try to examine “Horizontal Merger Guidelines” in the following section. 
 
         (1) Market Definition, Measurement and Concentration17 
 
                                                          
15 Suk-Min Kwon, “A Case Study on the Regulation of Business Integration,” Master thesis of Graduate 
School of Public Administration, Seoul National University, 16-8. 
16 DOJ & FTC, “The 1992 Merger Guidelines”, 1992. 
17 Suk-Min Kwon, 18-33.   
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The Agency uses successive iterations of the price increase test to define market. In 
performing successive iterations of the price increase test, the hypothetical monopolist 
is assumed to pursue maximum profits in deciding whether to raise the prices of any or 
all of the additional products under its control. This process will continue until a group 
of products would profitably impose at least a “small but significant and nontransitory 
increase in price”, including the price of a product of one of the merging firms. The 
Agency generally considers the relevant product market to be the smallest group of 
products that satisfies this test. 
In the above analysis, the Agency uses prevailing prices of the products of the merging 
firms and possible substitutes for such products, unless premerger circumstances are 
strongly suggestive of coordinated interaction, in which case the Agency uses a more 
reflective price than competitive price. However, the Agency may use likely future 
prices, absent the merger when changes in the prevailing prices can be predicted with 
reasonable reliability. 
In attempting to determine objectively the effect of a “small but significant and 
nontransitory” increase in price, the Agency, in most contexts, uses a price increase of 
five percent lasting for the foreseeable future. However, what constitutes a “small but 
significant and nontransitory” increase in price depends on the nature of the industry, 
and the Agency at times may use a price increase that is larger or smaller than five 
percent. 
So does the Agency in determining geographical market. 
Related to participants, participants include firms currently producing or selling the 
market’s products in the market’s geographic area. In addition, participants may include 
other firms depending on their likely supply responses to a “small but significant and 
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nontransitory” price increase. This includes vertically integrated firms to the extent that 
such inclusion accurately reflects their competitive significance in the relevant market 
prior to the merger. A firm is also viewed as a participant if, in response to a “small but 
significant and nontransitory” price increase, it likely would enter rapidly into 
production or sale of a market product in the market’s area without incurring significant 
sunk costs of entry and exit. Sunk costs are the acquisition costs of tangible and 
intangible assets that cannot be recovered through the redeployment of these assets 
outside the relevant market, i.e., costs uniquely incurred to supply the relevant product 
and geographic market. 
After identifying of firms that participate in the relevant market, the Agency normally 
calculates market shares for all firms as market participants based on the total sales or 
capacity currently devoted to the relevant market together with that which likely would 
be devoted to the relevant market in response to “small but significant and 
nontransitory” price increase. 
Market shares are calculated using the best indicator of firms’ future competitive 
significance. Dollar sales or shipments are generally used if firms are distinguished 
primarily by differentiation of their products. Unit sales are used if firms are 
distinguished primarily on the basis of their relative advantages in serving different 
buyers or groups of buyers. Physical capacity or reserves are used if it is these measures 
that most effectively distinguish firms. Typically, annual data are used, but where 
individual sales are large and infrequent so that annual data may be unrepresentative, 
the Agency may measure market shares over a longer period of time. The Agency does 
not include its sales or capacity to the extent that the firm’s capacity is committed or so 
profitably employed outside the relevant market that it would not be available to 
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respond to an increase in price in the market. 
Market concentration is a function of the number of firms in a market and their 
respective market shares. As an aid to the interpretation of market data, the Agency uses 
the Herfindahl Hershman Index (HHI) of market concentration.18 The agency considers 
both the post-merger market concentration and the increase in concentration resulting 
from the merger. 
The agency divides the spectrum if market concentration as measured by HHI into three 
regions that can be broadly characterized as unconcentrated (HHI below 1000), 
moderately concentrated (HHI between 1000 and 1800), and highly concentrated (HHI 
above 1800). 
In the unconcentrated market, mergers are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects 
and ordinarily require no further analysis. In the moderately concentrated market, 
mergers producing an increase in the HHI of less than 100 points are unlikely to have 
adverse competitive consequences and ordinarily require no further analysis. However, 
if the increase rate in the HHI is more than 100 points, it is considered to raise 
significant competitive concerns. In the highly concentrated market, mergers producing 
an increase in the HHI of less than 50 points, even in highly concentrated market, are 
considered unlikely to have adverse competitive consequences. If increasing rate in the 
                                                          
18 The HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the individual market shares of all the participants. It 
reflects both the distribution of the market shares of the top four firms and the composition of the market 
outside the top four firms. It also gives proportionately greater weight to the market shares of the larger 
firms in accord with their relative importance in competitive interactions. Although it is desirable to 
include all firms in the calculation, lack of information about small firms is not critical because such 
firms do not affect the HHI significantly. The HHI ranges from 10,000 (in the case of pure monopoly) to 
a number approaching zero (in the case of an atomistic market). 
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HHI is more than 50 points, it is considered to raise potentially significant competitive 
concerns. Also, it is presumed that mergers producing an increase in the HHI of more 
than 100 points are considered likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its 
exercise. 
However, in some situations like change of technology, market share and market 
concentration data may either understate or overstate the likely future competitive 
significance of a firm or firms in the market or the impact of a merger. 
  
       
 
 
         (2) The Potential Adverse Competitive Effects of Merger 
 
Market share and concentration data provide only the starting point for analyzing the 
competitive effects, as well as entry, efficiencies and failure. Thus, it is necessary to 
analyze whether merger produces adverse competitive effect. The analysis of adverse 
competitive effect is divided into two cases, one is the case of lessening of competition 
through coordinated interaction and another is through unilateral effects. 
Coordinated interaction is comprised of actions by a group of firms that are profitable 
for each of them only as a result of the accommodating reactions of the others. 
Coordinated interaction needs three conditions: first, reaching terms of coordination, 
second, detecting deviation from those terms, and third, punishing deviation from those 
terms. Depending upon the circumstances, the following market factors may be 
relevant: the availability of key information concerning market condition, transactions 
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and individual competitors; the extent of firm and product heterogeneity; pricing or 
marketing practices typically employed by firms in the market; the characteristics of 
buyers and sellers; and the characteristics of typical transactions. 
Certain market conditions that are conductive to reaching terms of coordination also 
may be conductive to detecting or punishing deviations from those terms. The extent to 
which any specific market conditions necessary to coordinated interaction depends upon 
on the circumstances of the particular case. 
In determining reaching terms of coordination, the Agency considers product or firm 
homogeneity, existing practices among firms, practices not necessarily themselves such 
as standardization of pricing or product variables, and procuring key information. In 
order to determine detecting and punishing deviations, the Agency considers existing 
practices among firms, keeping secretly key information about specific transactions or 
individual price or output levels, and demand and cost fluctuations etc. 
A merger may diminish competition even if it does not lead to increased likelihood of 
successful coordinated interaction in case adverse competitive effect exists and market 
share is more than 35 percent. In the differentiated products market, a merger between 
firms in a market for differentiated products may diminish competition by enabling the 
merged firm to profit by unilaterally raising the price of one or both products above the 
premerger level. Some of the sales loss due to the price rise merely are diverted to the 
product of the merger partner and depending on relative margins, capturing such sales 
loss through merge may make the price increase profitable even though it would not 
have been profitable premerger. In the homogeneous product market, a merger may 
increase profit by constraining output and enhancing price in case firms are 
differentiated due to the difference of production ability. 
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         (3) Entry Analysis 
 
The Agency examines the timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency. In other words, the 
Agency employs a three step methodology to assess whether committed entry would 
deter or counteract a competitive effect of concern. 
The first step assesses whether entry can achieve significant market impact within a 
timely period. In order to deter or counteract the competitive effects of concern, entrants 
quickly must achieve a significant impact on price in the relevant market. The Agency 
considers timely only those committed entry alternatives that can be achieved within 
two years from initial planning to significant market impact. An entry alternative is 
defined by the actions the firm must take in order to produce and sell in the market. 
An entry alternative is likely if it would be profitable at premerger prices and if such 
prices could be secured by the entrant. The committed entrant will be unable to secure 
prices at premerger levels if its output is too large for the market to absorb without 
depressing prices further. Thus, entry is unlikely if the minimum viable scale is larger 
than the likely sales opportunity available to entrants. 
Third step assesses whether timely and likely entry would be sufficient to return market 
prices to their premerger levels. This end may be accomplished either through multiple 
entry or individual entry at a sufficient scale. Entry may not be sufficient, even though 
timely and likely, there are the constraints on availability of essential assets, due to 
incumbent control, make it impossible for entry profitably to achieve the necessary 
level of sales. 
In assessing whether entry will be timely, likely, and sufficient, the Agency recognizes 
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that precise and detailed information may be difficult or impossible to obtain. In such 
instances, the Agency will rely on all available evidence bearing on whether entry will 
satisfy the conditions of timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency. 
 
       (4) Efficiencies 
 
The Agency examines some mergers may be reasonably necessary to achieve 
significant net efficiencies. Cognizable efficiencies include, but are not limited to, 
achieving economies of scale, better integration of production facilities, plant 
specialization, and distribution operations of the merging firms. The Agency may also 
consider claimed efficiencies resulting from reductions in general selling, administrative 
and overhead expenses, and distribution of the merging firms etc. However, the Agency 
rejects claims of efficiencies if equivalent or comparable savings can reasonably be 
achieved by the parties through other means. 
 
       (5) Failure and Exiting Assets 
 
The Agency considers that a merger is not likely to create or enhance market power or 
facilitate its exercise if the following circumstances are met: 1) the allegedly failing 
firm would be unable to meet its financial obligations in the near future; 2) it would not 
be able to reorganize successfully under bankruptcy; 3) it has made unsuccessful good-
faith efforts to elicit reasonable alternative offers of acquisition of the assets of the 
failing firm that would keep its tangible and intangible assets in the relevant market and 
pose a less severe danger to competition than does the proposed merger; and 4) absent 
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the acquisition, the assets of the failing firm would exit the relevant market. In the 
failing division, upon applying appropriate cost allocation rules, the division must have 
a negative cash flow on an operating basis. Also absent the acquisition, it must be that 
the assets of the division would exit the relevant market in the near future if not sold. 
The owner of the failing division also must have complied with the competitively 
preferable purchaser requirement of failing firm.  
 
     2. Vertical Integration 
 
       a) Theoretical Background 
 
We shall say that a firm is vertically integrated if that firm transfers internally form one 
to another a commodity that could be sold in the market without major adaptation.19 
Even if there are many opinions on vertical integration, there has been no discernible 
convergence of opinion regarding the dominant incentives for and effects of vertical 
integration. 
One of these theories is that the existence of transactions costs might provide an 
incentive for vertical integration explored by Coase.20 
In essence, Coase views the production process as a chain of more or less discrete 
stages at which various inputs are combined to produce intermediate products that are 
employed in following stages until the final link is reached and the consumer good 
                                                          
19 David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Government and Business: The Economics of Antitrust and 
Regulation (Orlando: the Dryden Press, 1995), 297. 
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emerges. Each link of this chain may be connected either by an intermediate product 
market that functions through the price mechanism or by entrepreneurial coordination if 
successive stages are embodied within the same firm. Then, since each of these 
alternative coordinating mechanisms gives rise to particular kinds of costs, the firm will 
base its decision of whether to incorporate preceding and succeeding stages of 
production within the purview of the entrepreneur on a comparison of the relative costs 
of each. Thus, the make-or-buy/use-or-sell decision turns on the comparative costs of 
coordinating productive activities within the firm or through the price system, and its 
outcome at the various stages determines the size of the firm in relation to the 
production chain. 
Coase elaborates the costs associated with use of the price system. These include: 1) 
search costs to discover what the relevant prices are; 2) negotiation costs involved in the 
contracting process; 3) costs of reduced flexibility associated with long-term contracts; 
and 4) costs imposed on market transactions by governmental or regulatory bodies. 
Also, the costs associated with internal entrepreneurial coordination are discussed. He 
argues that in terms of the number of production stages that are internalized, firm size is 
determined by equating these two kinds of costs at the margin. In other words, the firm 
will expand until the cost of coordinating the next stage internally is equal to or greater 
than the cost of coordinating these stages through the price system. 
However, Williamson has provided the most detailed analysis of transactions costs and 
their role in influencing the integration of firms.21 He explained in detail the myriad 
                                                                                                                                                                          
20 R. H. Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica, vol. 4 ( November 1937), 386-405. 
21 O. E. Williamson, “The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations,” American 
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factors that determine the organizational costs of markets and firms and argues that 
“transactional failures” account for much of the “internalization” if coordination 
activities. Three basic properties of the firm are seen as encouraging internal 
organization as a substitute for the market mechanism. 
First, internalization of the transfer of an intermediate product form one stage of 
production to the next harmonizes the opposing interests of the parties to the transaction. 
This cojoining of previously antagonistic objectives may be expected to be particularly 
attractive in situations in which small-numbers bargaining obtains or uncertainly exists 
regarding the final outcome of the actual transaction. 
Second, entrepreneurial control expands the range and sensitivity of the instruments 
available for coordinating and enforcing input decisions. The reward and penalty 
mechanisms available within the firm may provide a relatively efficient mechanism for 
the resolution of transactional conflicts. Such conflicts are more likely to arise in 
instance where contractual completeness cannot be attained and where the need for 
sequential adaptive decision-making is dominant. 
Third, economies of information exchange may be achieved by combining successive 
stages of production under common control. Such economies are likely to exist in 
situations involving informational asymmetry between the parties to the exchange, the 
presence of a moral hazard, or, in general, any time that uncertainty is intertwined with 
opposing interests. Other potential incentives for vertical integration are recognized by 
Williamson, by the primary focus is on the minimization of organizational or 
transactions costs as the principal motive for linking production stages by internal 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Economic Review, vol. 61 (May 1971), 112-23; and O. E. Williamson, Antitrust Economics: Merger, 
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control. 
In addition to the effects of risk on transactions costs, Arrow dealt with vertical 
integration as a response to the stochastic elements confronting the firm.22 Arrow has 
examined the influence on the firm’s organizational choice of stochastic input supply 
price with asymmetric information between participants at the upstream and 
downstream stages. Production of the final product is assumed to occur under constant 
cost conditions with two inputs – capital and raw materials. Then assuming that 
downstream of production and that upstream firms have information on the supply price 
of the raw material one period in advance, acquisition of raw materials producers by 
final product firm reduces costs by allowing inputs to be combined in efficient 
proportions. Essentially, vertical integration is seen as a means of acquiring predictive 
information on the relative prices o inputs at the relevant point in time. 
Arrow points out that the need to integrate to acquire this information must ultimately 
rest on the assumption that a market exists for upstream firms but that a market for the 
information itself does not exist. Also, it must be assumed that a futures market or a 
market for contingent claims on the raw material does not exist. 
While many theories centers that vertical integration enhances internal efficiency of 
firms, they do not consider that vertical integration may enhance adverse competitive 
effects. Recent trends of theories on the adverse competitive effects of vertical 
integration are that the adverse competitive effects happen in exceptional case. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Contraction and Strategic Behavior (New York: Blackwell, 1987), 24-38. 
22 See K. J. Arrow, “Vertical Integration and Communication,” Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 6 
(Autumn 1975), 173-83; and David L. Kaserman, “Theories of Vertical Integration: Implications for 
Antitrust Policy,” Antitrust Bulletin, vol. 23 (Fall 1978), 492-93. 
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Related to the adverse competitive effects of vertical integration, there exists some 
theories: market foreclosure, raising barriers to entry, and price squeeze & supply 
squeeze. 
The basic idea behind the foreclosure theory is that an input supplier, by merging with 
one of its customer firms (or an input customer, by merging with one of its suppliers), 
effectively removes that firm’s purchases (or sales) from the open market. By so doing, 
vertical integration reduces the size of the market that is left available to other 
nonintegrated firms in the industry. This reduction in the size of the “open” market is 
alleged to have anticompetitive consequences.23 However, the foreclosure doctrine has 
not been generally well received by economists. This cool reception is due to that the 
fundamental presumption underlying this doctrine – that vertical integration entirely 
removes a given set of transactions from the pressure of market force – does not make 
economic sense.  
Whether and to what extent vertical integration increases barriers to entry into a given 
industry has been debated for some time. Anyhow, when the market share of merging 
firm in the product-selling market is high, firms which consider entering producing 
market may expect extremely high competition in the lessened product-selling market 
in order to succeed in entering, which prevents firms from entering producing market. 
In addition, in case the market share of merging firm is high in the raw material market, 
firms which considers entering product market must try to enter both product and raw 
material market at the same time. This is much burden for incoming firms, since it 
needs high technology and lots of fund. This means barriers to entry are raised, since a 
                                                          
23 Kaserman & Mayo, 312-13. 
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firm must enter another market so as to enter one market. 
If non-merging firms are supplied by merging firm which occupies high market share, 
merging firm may squeeze and set higher price through price discrimination, which 
results in adverse competitive effect. Also, merging firm may prevent non-merging firm 
through denying enough supply, i.e. supply squeeze. 
 
     b) The 1984 Merger Guidelines of DOJ 
 
These guidelines were issued in 1984 and identify three principal avenues through 
which a vertical merger could have anticompetitive consequences. First, relying upon 
the theory of potential competition, the department states that “in some circumstances, 
the non-horizontal merger of a firm already in a market with a potential entrant to that 
market may adversely affect competition in the market. Second, “in certain 
circumstances, the vertical integration resulting from vertical mergers could create 
competitively objectionable barriers to entry.” Third, “ a high level of vertical 
integration by upstream firms into the associated retail market may facilitate collusion 
in the upstream market by making it easier to monitor price.” 
Related to first issue, in describing the circumstances under which the department is 
likely to challenge a vertical merger on grounds of a lessening of potential competition, 
explicit recognition is given to the conditions that must exist for such a merger to have 
anticompetitive consequences under that theory. Specifically, the Agency describes four 
considerations. 
? First, barriers to entry are unlikely to affect market performance if the structure of the 
market is otherwise not conductive to monopolization or collusion. Adverse 
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competitive effects are likely only if overall consideration, or the largest firm’s 
market share, is high. The Agency is unlikely to challenge a potential competition 
merger unless overall concentration of the acquired firm’s market is above 1,800 HHI. 
? Second, if the entry to the market is generally easy, the fact that entry is marginally 
easier for one or more firms is unlikely to affect the behavior of the firms in the 
market. The Agency is unlikely to challenge a potential competition merger when 
new entry into the acquired firm’s market can be accomplished by firms without 
any specific entry advantages. 
? Third, if more a few firms have the same or comparable advantage in entering the 
acquired firm’s market, the elimination of one firm is unlikely to have any adverse 
competitive effect. The Agency is unlikely to challenge a potential competition 
merger if the entry advantage ascribed to the acquiring firm (or another advantage 
of comparable importance) is also possessed by three or more other firms. 
? Fourth, the Agency considers expected efficiencies in determining whether to 
challenge a potential competition merger. 
Thus, in this area the guidelines more accurately reflect the economic implications of 
the theory of potential competition. To the extent actual enforcement decisions follow 
those guidelines, socially beneficial should emerge. However, there are some critical 
literature on this issue.24 
Second, the guidelines recognize that three conditions are necessary for a vertical 
                                                          
24  See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Robert Pitofsky, “Antitrust Merger Policy and the Reagan 
Administration,” Antitrust Bulletin (Summer 1988), 211-32; and Malcom B. Coate & Fred S. 
McChensney, “Empirical Evidence on FTC Enforcement of the Merger Guidelines,” Economic Inquiry 
30 (April 1992), 277-93. 
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merger to increase entry barrier to an objectionable level. 
? First, the degree of vertical integration between the two markets must be so 
extensive that entrants to one market ... also would have to enter the other market ... 
simultaneously. 
? Second, the requirement of entry at the secondary level must make entry at the 
primary level significantly more difficult and less likely to occur. 
? Finally, the structure and other characteristics of the primary market must be 
otherwise so conductive performance that the increased difficulty of entry is likely 
to affect its performance. 
The guidelines go on to explain how market structure will influence enforcement 
actions. That is, the Agency is unlikely to challenge a merger unless overall 
concentration of the primary market is above 1800 HHI. 
Finally, the guidelines indicate that vertical mergers are most likely to facilitate 
collusion when a producer vertically integrates into retail distribution. 
It is noticeable that guidelines focus on the structure of the acquired firm’s industry. It 
is only when that market is concentrated (that is, when the HHI exceeds 1800) that a 
vertical merger is subject to challenge.25 
 
                                                          
25 Kaserman & Mayo, 326-27. 
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III.  American Antitrust Laws and Enforcement Agency 
 
A.  American Antirust Laws 
  
The merger in the Unite State is regulated and administrated by DOJ and FTC. There 
are three major federal antitrust laws referred by DOJ and FTC: the Sherman Act, the 
Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act. 
 
    1. The Sherman Act26 
 
The Sherman Act has stood since 1890 as the principal law expressing American 
commitment to a free market economy. The Sherman Act outlaws all contracts, 
combinations, and conspiracies that unreasonably restrain interstate trade. This includes 
agreements among competitors to fix prices, rig bids and allocated customers. The 
Sherman Act also makes it a crime to monopolize any part of interstate commerce. 
A lawful monopoly exists when only one firm provides products or service, and it has 
become the only supplier not because its product or service is superior to others, but by 
suppressing competition with anticompetitive conduct. The Act is not violated simply 
when one firm’s vigorous competition and lower prices take sales from its less efficient 
competitors. Rather, that is competition working properly. 
The Sherman Act violations are punished as criminal felonies. DOJ alone is empowered 
                                                          
26 See the web site of DOJ; and Man-Ok Cho, “Theory and Practice of American Antitrust Policy,” 
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to bring criminal prosecutions under the Sherman Act. Individual violators can be fined 
up to $35,000 and sentenced to up to 3 years in federal prison for each offense; 
corporations can be fined up to $10million for each offense. Under some circumstances, 
the fines can go even higher. 
 
    2. The Clayton Act 
 
The Clayton Act is a civil statute (it carries no criminal penalties) that was passed in 
1914 and significantly amended in 1950. The Clayton Act prohibits mergers that are 
likely to lessen competition. Under the Act, the government challenges those mergers 
that a careful economic analysis shows are likely to increase prices to consumers. All 
persons merger above certain size must notify both the Antitrust Division and the FTC. 
The Act also prohibits certain other business practices that under certain circumstances 
may harm competition. 
 
    3. The Federal Trade Commission Act27 
 
The Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits unfair methods of competition in inerstate 
commerce, but carries no criminal penalties. It also created the Federal Trade 
Commission to police violations of Act. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Master thesis of Chunnam National University, 4-6. 
27 See the web site of the DOJ; and Marshall C. Howard, Antitrust and Trade Regulation (Engelwood 
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    4. The Relationship of Antitrust Laws 
 
The main act related to merger is section 7 of Clayton Act even if it is applied by 
section 1 of Sherman Act, the prevention of trade restraint and section 5 of Federal 
Trade Commission Act, the prevention of unfair trade.28 The Clayton Act was made in 
1914 in order to prevent specific behavior in its incipiency which may tend to create 
monopolization. 
 
B.  Enforcement Agency29 
 
   1. DOJ 
      a) Structure30 
 
The president of the Antitrust Division is an Assistant Attorney General whom the 
President nominates and Congress ratifies. The Antitrust Division has eleven sections – 
eight law sections, two economy sections, and one administration section – and seven 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Cliffs: Prentice Hall Inc., 1983), 25-7. 
28 The section 7 of Clayton act reads that no corporate shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or 
any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of one or more corporations engaged 
in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section the country, the effect of such acquisition, of 
such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock by the voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may 
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.  
29 A. D. Neale, The Antitrust Laws of the United States of America (Cambridge: The University Press, 
1970), 373-400. 
30 Kwang-Shik Shin, The International Comparison of Competition Policy: the United States, Japan, 
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local offices.  
The job of five sections of eight law sections is related to legal procedure: Litigation I 
Section and Litigation II Section work for non-regulation industries and 
Communications & Finance Section, Transportation, Energy & Agricultural Section, 
Professions & Intellectual Property Section work for regulatory industries. The 
operation of Foreign Commerce Section is things related to activities of international 
organizations such as OECD and UNCTAD. In addition, this Section covers the activity 
of Trade Policy Review Group and trade policies. Legal Policy Section covers the 
evaluation of legal policy and making laws. Appellate Section works in the area of 
appellate procedure. 
Since 1985 the activity of economists in the Antitrust Division was increased and two 
economic sections, Economic Litigation Section and Economic Regulatory Section, 
cover making policy and enforcement of antitrust.   
 
      b) Procedures 
 
The Antitrust Division must first detect crime before it can prosecute it. This is one of 
the most important of the difficulties of antitrust enforcement. Detection in fact relies on 
complaints which come from the public at large or, more often, from businessmen who 
are injured or threatened by restraint of trade or monopoly. 
As well as detection, there must be selection, since a vast field of business activity has 
to be covered with limited resources. This selection is determined by the subject of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and Germany (Seoul: KDI, 1995), 48-9. 
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antitrust campaign and authenticated complaints. 
However, information from complaints of the public or information which the agency 
acquires is rarely complete or detailed enough for its lawyers to be able to prove a case 
in the courts. Therefore, there is need for investigation. 
Just as most crimes are brought to book by the evidence of witness, antitrust case need 
evidence. To get evidence of antitrust offenses it is always necessary to search among 
the industry’s own records and correspondence. However, this creates a serious 
difficulty in getting evidence because a businessman accused of an antitrust offense is 
not compelled any more than a suspected murderer to provide the evidence to condemn 
him. In order to solve this problem, the DOJ uses Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
or Antitrust Division who can carry out the normal type of police inquiry into a 
suspected crime. Alternatively, if the violations are of such a nature that criminal 
remedies seem appropriate, the DOJ seeks an investigation by a Grand Jury. 
As to the scope of its inquiry, it may call for any documents and subpoena any witness 
and is limited only by a duty not to impose an unreasonable and unnecessary burden 
upon the witness. The Grand Jury inquiry is an ex parte proceeding in which the firm 
under suspicion has no opportunity to advance any form of defense or justification for 
its act. Yet if it ends in an indictment, this will of itself carry a stigma of criminality, 
even though there may subsequently be an acquittal. 
Once DOJ is in possession of the information needed for making a case, it has to decide 
whether to proceed by criminal prosecution or by civil action. Most of the biggest cases 
in antitrust history have been civil proceedings. In general, there are two aspects of the 
choice between criminal and civil proceedings: The first is the question of what the 
action is to achieve and the second aspect is simply of doing justice to those who are 
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subject to antitrust discipline. 
It is sometimes suggested that more could be done by DOJ by way of informal 
procedures for enforcing law. Although this type of informal, administrative 
adjudication has increased, there are necessity severe limitations to what can be done in 
this way. 
 
    2. FTC 
 
The Fair Trade Commission was established in 1914 to enforce the FTC Act and the 
Clayton Act. There are five commissioners who are appointed by the President and 
ratified by congress. The President appoints the Chairman among the Commissioner. 
Now the Chairman of FTC is Robert Pitofsky.31 
The organization of FTC include the Commission, Office of Public Affairs, Office of 
Congressional Relations, Office of the Executive Director, Office of the General 
Counsel, Office of the Secretary, Administrative Law Judge, Office of Inspector 
General, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Bureau of Competition, Bureau of Economics, 
and Regional Offices. 
FTC may begin an investigation in different ways, Letters from consumers or 
businesses, Congressional inquiries, or articles on consume or economic subjects may 
trigger FTC action. Investigations are either public or non public. Generally, FTC 
investigations are nonpublic in order to protect both the investigation and the economy. 
                                                          
31 See the web site of FTC; and Kenneth M. Parzych, Public Policy and the Regulatory Environment 
(Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 1993), 102-13. 
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If FTC believes a violation of the law occurred, it might attempt to obtain voluntary 
compliance by entering into a consent order with the company. A company that signs a 
consent order need not admit that it violated the law, but it must agree to stop the 
disputed practices outlined in an accompanying complaint. 
If a consent agreement cannot be reached, FTC may issue an administrative complaint. 
If an administrative complaint is issued, a formal proceeding that is much like a court 
trial begins before an administrative law judge: evidence is submitted, testimony is 
heard, and witnesses are examined and cross-examined. If a law violation is found, a 
cease and desist order or other appropriate relief may be issued. Initial decisions by 
administrative law judges may be appealed to the full Commission. 
Finial decisions issued by the Commission may be appealed to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals and, ultimately, to the U.S. Supreme Court. If the Commission’s position is 
upheld, FTC in certain circumstances, may then seek consumer redress in court. If the 
company ever violates the order, the Commission also may seek civil penalties or an 
injunction. 
In some circumstances, FTC can go directly to court to obtain an injunction, civil 
penalties, or consumer redress. This usually happens in cases of on going consumer 
fraud. By going directly to court, FTC can stop the fraud before too many consumers 
are injured. 
The commission can also issue trade regulation rules. If FTC staff finds evidence of 
unfair or deceptive practices in an entire industry, it can recommend that the 
Commission begin a rulemaking proceeding. Through rulemaking proceeding, the 
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public will have opportunities to attend hearings and file written comments. The 
Commission will consider these comments along with the entire rulemaking record-the 
hearing testimony, the staff report, and the Presiding Officer’s report- before making a 
final decision on the proposed rule. A FTC rule may be challenged in any of the U.S. 
Courts of Appeal. When issued, these rules have the force of law. 
 
    3. Relationship of the Antitrust Division of DOJ and FTC 
 
As has already noted, these two bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over a considerable 
part of the field. Broadly speaking DOJ takes to itself the enforcement of the Sherman 
Act, in particular the prosecution serious and significant infringements of that act as I 
mentioned it. Also, it plays the major role in the enforcement of section 7 of the Clayton 
Act. It normally takes action under other sections of the Clayton Act only when charges 
under that Act are a factor in a broader picture of Sherman Act violation. FTC enforces 
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and takes the main brunt of the work 
under the remaining sections of the Clayton Act. 
The Commission has no criminal jurisdiction. The procedures adopted by these two law 
enforcing agencies differ considerably. 
DOJ, alone having criminal jurisdiction, must naturally concern itself largely with 
flagrant offences against the criminal provisions of the Sherman Act, and it is 
convenient to begin with this activity. Under section 4 of The Sherman Act DOJ also, 
however, has the duty of instituting, civil proceedings to prevent and restrain any 
violation of the Act. 
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IV.  Background and Aspect of the Great Merger Movement 
 
A.  Background of the Great Merger Movement 
 
I will review upholding changes background in the late nineteen century. This review, I 
believe, may increase the outstanding of the Great Merger Movement. It covers 
economic background, and social background. 
 
    1. Economic Background 
 
The rapid transformation from a largely agricultural to an increasingly industrial society 
in the United States began following the Civil War. The Civil War stimulated further 
the growth of manufactures and witnessed the beginning of mass production in some 
industries. Although there were fairly wide fluctuations in the economy between the 
war and 1890 the period is generally marked by unprecedented industrial expansion.32 
As Table 1 shows, the rapid growth of manufacturing industry changed the economic 
structure. 
 
      
 
                                                          
32 Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), 160. 
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Table 1. The Increasing Rate of Value Added in Agriculture and Industry 
 
Year 
Agriculture  
(%) 
Industry  
(%) 
1839 
1869 
1899 
1929 
78 
57 
35 
17 
22 
43 
65 
83 
 
Source: Robert E. Gallman and Edward S. Howle, “Trends in the Structure of the American 
Economy since 1840,” in Fogel and Engerman, eds., The Reinterpretation of American 
Economic History (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 26. 
 
According to Table 1 the value added of industrial goods in 1839 was 22 percent, but 
following 1839 the increasing rates of value added in manufacturing industry by per 
every thirty years was around 20 percent, which means that the industrialization in the 
United States was made rapidly. 
On the contrary, the increasing rate of value added in agriculture was decreased sharply. 
The increasing rate of value added in agriculture was 78 percent in 1838, but the 
decreasing rate of value added in agriculture was nearly 20 percent by per each 30 year. 
By 1880 the half of the whole workers were hired in agriculture which contributed to 
absorbing unemployees in non-agricultural industries and broadening the agricultural 
market for consumer goods. However, the development gap was increasing between 
agriculture and industry as years went on. As a result, the move of workers toward 
manufacturing industry was increased. In 1840 more than 60 percent of employees 
worked in the first industry, only 9 percent and 8 percent of employees worked in 
manufacturing and the third industry respectively. In 1930 only 24 percent of the whole 
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workers occupied in the first industry like agriculture. 
 
             Table 2.  Growth of Manufacturing Industry             (%) 
 1870 1900 1905 
Manufacturing 
Production Index 
       25 100 140 
Rate of per GNP 35.8 76.4 71.5 
 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 
1970 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 231. 
 
The following table illustrates development during these years. 
 
Table 3.  Developments between the Civil War and 1890 
No. of Establishments 
(factories and hand 
and neighborhood 
industries) 
 
 
Average wage 
 
 
Value of Products 
 
 
 
   Year 
 
Number 
 
Increase 
(%) 
 
Number 
 
Increase
(%) 
    
   Dollars 
 
Increase
(%) 
1869 252,148 2,053,996  3,385,860,354  
1879 253,852 0.7 2,732,595 33.0 5,369,579,191 58.8 
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1889 355,405 40.0 4,251,535 55.6 9,372,378,843 74.5 
 
Source: Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 
1955), 63. 
 
The small increase in number of establishments between 1869 and 1879 is probably 
indicative of the extraordinary mortality of small businesses in the unstable postwar 
period. An indication of the increasing degree of mechanization ins the fact that 
whereas the number of wage earners a little more than doubled between 1869 and 1889, 
the value of the dollar almost trebled.33 
During these period the structure of manufacturing industry was rapidly being alerted. 
Among the outstanding characteristics of the era were the widespread adoption of the 
corporate form of organization and the appearance of big business as a dominating 
economic factor. Mass production called for heavy fixed investments, which in turn put 
a limit on the number of newcomers in many industries and sometimes made 
competition between existing establishments.  
Under such conditions admiration for bigness, a belief that any increase in size meant 
an increase in efficiency, and the desire to reap promoters’ profits became partly one of 
reasons causing combination. 34  Furthermore, firms unwilling to abandon their 
independence to join combination were often persuaded or forced to do so by the use of 
practices and underhanded methods of competition as typified by the activities of such 
                                                          
33 However, the table does not consider the difference in the value of the dollar at both ends of this 
period. 
34 Thorelli, 161. 
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enterprises as the Standard Oil Company.35  
 
   2. Social Background 
 
In the abreast of the development of economy, there existed rapid change in some part: 
the expansion of population toward the West, the establishment of railroad from 1850 to 
1870s, the development of city and market, and new inventions.36 
 
 a) The Expansion of population 
 
At that time the United States depended upon immigration policy, not upon natural 
increase of population. The population of immigration was 3,140 million in 1860 and 
4,000 million in 1870. In 1910 the population of immigration became 9,200 million 
people which was three times as many as that of immigration in 1860. This expansion 
of population led to expansion of supply and demand in economy, developing markets. 
The regional change of population is as follows. 
 
        Table 4.  The Regional Dispersion Ratio of Population (1840-1930)    (%) 
                                                          
35 The Standard Oil Company was a firm reorganized in 1870 by Rockefeller. The early development of 
the oil industry was hampered by a lack of refineries and a shortage of cheap transportation facilities. 
With the knowledge of these two handicaps Rockefeller united four small refineries in 1867. This 
combination became the Standard Oil Company. Even if the Standard was very successful, it had been 
criticized, since Standard’s victory was due to the unscrupulous and often extra-legal methods to which 
Rockefeller resorted .  
36 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., “The Beginnings of “Big business” in American industry,” The Business 
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        1840 1870 1900 1930 
Northernwest 39.5 31.9 27.6 27.9 
Central North 19.6 33.7 34.6 31.3 
South 40.6 31.9 32.2 30.7 
West 0.3 2.6 5.7 10.0 
 
Source: Chu-Han Bae and Sung-Hee Hong, “A Study of the Great Merger Movement,” Annual 
Thesis Book, vol.23, (Seoul: Sungshil University, 1993), 5. 
 
    Table 5.  The Ratio of Population in Urban and Rural Area (1840-1930)   (%) 
        1840 1870 1900 1930 
Urban 10.8 25.7 39.7 56.2 
Rural 89.2 74.3 60.3 43.8 
 
Source: Chu-Han Bae and Sung-Hee Hong, “A Study of the Great Merger Movement,” Annual 
Thesis Book, vol.23, (Seoul: Sungshil University, 1993), 6. 
 
While the population of northern area was 40 percent of all populations in 1840, but it 
became 28 percent in 1930, that of the West changed from 1 percent into 10.0 percent 
during these years. At the same time, the population of urban area was 11 percent of all 
population in 1840, whereas that of urban area was 40 percent in 1900.37 This surge of 
population redispersion resulted in change of employment and move toward the West. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
History Review 33 (Spring 1959), 335-37. 
37 The growing importance of industry and trade is reflected in the urbanization process of the period. In 
1870 there were 226 cities with 8,000 or more inhabitants; in 1880 the number was 285, and in 1890 it 
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      b) Development of technology 
 
“The Industrial Revolution” ushered in a period of unprecedented technological 
progress, evidenced by a vast number of inventions in various fields as well as by 
thoroughgoing changed in the techniques of production. This includes the new methods 
of utilizing steam, gas, coal, and oil as sources of productive energy, the phenomenal 
progress in iron and steel production and the introduction of automatic machinery to 
replace simple tools in manufacturing industries.38 The development of such office 
machinery as the typewriter, adding machine and cash register also contributed to the 
organization and expansion of business activity. Of equally great importance was the 
increasing use of swiftly interchangeable machinery part as well as the growing of the 
values of product standardization and the specialization of the production of individual 
firms. These developments were all prerequisites for the large-scale production rapidly 
becoming characteristic of the new era. Table 6 reflects well the surge of new invention 
at those times. 
Table 6.  The Number of Patent Licenses (1870-1910) 
                                                                                                                                                                          
was 445.  
38 Production of pig iron in the United States in thousands of gross tons in the year 1870 amounted to 
1,665, in 1880 to 3,835 and in 1890 to 9,203. The important thing to the development of American 
industry was the extraordinary decline in prices of basic materials in this period. From 1866 to 1897 the 
price of pig iron, in gold, fell from $33.26 to $12.10 per ton; and the price of Bessemer steel rails over the 
same period, also in gold, fell from $120.18 to $18.75 per ton. The tapering off of gold production 
throughout the world may have had something to do with price decline; but more important thing was the 
lowering of costs due to technology and superior management. See Thorelli, footnote 33, 63. 
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Year Invention Design Total 
1870 12,137 737 13,518 
1880 12,903 514 14,204 
1890 25,313 886 28,304 
1900 24,646 1,754 29,881 
1910 35,141 636 39,496 
 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 
1970 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 957-8. 
 
     c) The development of transportation system 
 
One more primary requirement was met during this period in the creation of a 
comprehensive transportation system.39 Without efficient transportation of cattle, for 
instance, the possibilities of the Chicago meat-packing industry would have been 
limited indeed. However, there was a cumulative mutual stimulus here, the larger 
factories demanding wider market in their turn. By means of railroads especially, and 
telecommunications, local markets grew into regional ones and regional into national 
ones in a few decades. 
These development in the industrial economy created a new pattern of competition 
which was becoming characteristic in a steadily growing number of industries. In order 
                                                          
39 Railroad mileage in operation in 1870 was 52,887; in 1889 it had grown to 93,262 and in 1890 to 
166,654. 
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to evade bankruptcy companies must choose new strategy like combination.40  
 
     d) Growth of opposition to trusts 
 
Wartime prosperity stemmed from the Civil War was followed by a period of strongly 
declining prices of farm products, which by and large extended well beyond 1890. It is 
in this almost permanent agricultural depression during the postwar decades that 
western discontent took root. The farmer felt that he had numerous other causes of 
complaint such as the policies of eastern credit institutions. Their interest rates were 
held to be extortionate in period of declining agricultural prices and recurrent legislative 
measures to reevaluate the currency. Furthermore, eastern capital was suspected of 
desiring to check independent economics development in the South and West. 
Discontent was also widely felt with the allegedly “monopolistic” price policies of 
producers of agricultural machinery and other goods needed in rural areas. Certain farm 
groups began to apply the term “monopoly” indiscriminately to any industrial or trading 
establishment.41 
However, antitrust sentiment was not only farmers’. In fact, hatred of monopoly is one 
of oldest American political habits and like most profound traditions, it consisted of an 
essentially permanent idea expressed differently at different times. The trust was 
popularly regarded as nothing but a new form of monopoly, and the whole force of 
                                                          
40 The high competition was one of motives of accelerating merger movement. However, I will discuss 
in the following pages whether more important motives to accelerate merger movement existed. 
41 Thorelli, 161. 
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tradition was focused against it immediately.42 
In the years immediately before Sherman Act, between 1888 and 1890, the public hated 
the trust fervently. Radical agitators and polite reformers spoke of the “people’s wrath”. 
Journalists gave every action of the trusts and of their critics ample publicity, which 
suggests that they did not find their readers indifferent.43 
The general position of American economists during the years after 1885 may be 
detected by American Economic Association. Basically, economists believed that 
Darwin’s law governed the evolution of human society and social organism. Any social 
change was an organization that many producers formed in order to act jointly, these 
economists regarded it as an evolutionary advance. Thus they assumed that trust was the 
only way to correct competition and the chaotic economic conditions. They concluded 
that trust was not only inevitable but in many instances beneficial even if they 
advocated some sort of public regulation. 
However, the lawyers saw that the common law permitted trust in some instances and 
prohibited in the others. Some of lawyers insisted that the common law was good 
enough without acting criminal statues regulating trusts if it were only administered. 
Other lawyers, however, said that more force was necessary. In spite of their opinion, 
they did not suggest any statues should be framed. Furthermore, the states lacked 
authority to regulate corporations engaged in interstate commerce. Therefore, if antitrust 
legislation were needed and it were to be effective against powerful trust, Congress 
                                                          
42 William Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America (New York: Random House, 1965), 59. 
43 See Thorelli, 132-43. However, John D. Clark questioned this standard opinion at his book, Federal 
Trust Policy in 1931. Clark concluded that few books and journals were published on the trust problem 
before 1890 and the public was not hysterical but indifferent. On the contrary, William Letwin criticized 
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must pass it.   
 
B.  Aspect of the Great Merger Movement  
 
Before discussing aspect of the first merger movement, I will examin in short aspect of 
merger 1870s and 1880s and thereafter review the first merger movement. 
 
    1. Aspect of Merger Movement during the 1870s and 1880s 
 
American manufacturers began in the 1870s to take the initial step to growth by way of 
merger- that is, to set up nationwide associations to control price and production. They 
did so primarily as a response to the continuing price decline, which became oppressive 
after the panic of 1873 ushered in a prolonged economic depression. That long-term 
price decline reflected the complex interaction between the supply of money and the 
rapid expansion of output.44 Industrial output soared as manufacturers widely adopted 
the new factory form of production. The wholesale price index on all commodities fell 
from 151 in 1869 to 82 in 1886, on farm products from 227 to 110. To most 
manufacturers the only practical responded to rising output and falling prices was  
from national associations to maintain prices by curtailing production. 
By the 1880s these federation had become part of the normal way of doing business in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Clark, insisting more journals than Clark realized were covered trust issue. See Letwin, 54-70.  
44 See Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwarz, A Monetary History of the United Sates, 1867-1960 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), Chap. 2.This chapter provides authoritative account of this 
interaction. 
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most American industries. Trade associations for the purpose of controlling price and 
production had appeared in the mechanical industries, including those making lumber, 
woodware, flooring, and shoes etc. They came in the refining and other chemically 
oriented industries - those producing petroleum, rubber footware, explosives, glass, 
paper, and leather.45 In the hardware industries alone, over fifty different trades 
associations managed cartels for as many specialized products.46 As Table 7 shows, no 
industry appears to have been immune. Only in textiles, apparel, publishing, and 
printing were the number of trade associations small. 
 
                                                          
45 They came in the foundry and furnace industries-those making iron, steel, copper, brass, lead, and 
other metals. In addition, they occurred in industries fabricating metals into bars, wire, rails, mails, sheets, 
and all types of metal implements and machines. 
46 William H. Becker, “American Wholesale Hardware Trade Associations, 1870-1900,” Business 
History Review, vol. 45 (Summer 1971), 182-85. 
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Table 7.  Manufacturers’ Trade Associations in the Hardware Trades, 1870s and 1880s 
1870s 
Augrus, bits                                           Pumps     
Door locks                                            Cast iron butts 
Knobs                                                Rakes 
Padlocks                                              Furniture hardware 
Cast burts                                             Locks 
Fluting machines                                       Hose 
Stamped ware (common and deep fry pans)                  Bench planes 
Wood screws                                          Shears 
Nuts, bolts                                            Brass 
Table cutlery                                          Tacks 
Hinges                                               Axes 
Hollow ware (kettles, bellied pots, etc.)                     Clothes wringers 
Picks                                                Rules 
Mattocks                                             Bit braces 
Grub hoes                                            Sash weights 
Sledges, hammers                                      Furniture casters 
Strap, T.hinges                                        Carriage hardware 
Cordage                                             Wrought butts, hinges 
Nails                                                Stoves 
1880s 
Clocks                                               Bicycle tubing 
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Carriage bolts                                         Snaths 
Curry bombs                                          Truck locks 
Wire                                                 Wood planes 
Soil pipe, fittings                                       Circular saws 
Shovels                                               Sinks 
Stove boards                                           Padlocks 
Files                                                 Boring implements 
 
Source: William H. Becker, “American Wholesale Hardware Trade Associations, 1870-1900,” 
Business History Review, vol. 45 (Summer 1971), 1832. Aspect of the Great Merger 
Movement 
 
     2. Aspect of the Great Merger Movement 
 
The mergers of the 1890s came in two waves. One occurred between 1890 and 1893. 
The other and much larger surge began as the country recovered from the depression of 
the middle years of the decade. The first wave, resulting from the legal attack on 
combinations, the passage of the Sherman Act, and the revisions of the New Jersey law, 
lasted as long as times were prosperous. Hans Thorelli lists the names of 51 holding 
companies or “tight combinations” formed between 1890 and 1893.47 With coming of 
the depression of 1893 the number of new mergers fell off sharply. Only 27 occurred 
for the next three calendar years, 1894 through 1896. Then came the Great Merger 
Movement. In the following section I shall discuss the first merger movement. 
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    a) Characteristics 
 
The magnitude of merger activity can be described in two ways: first, in terms of the net 
number of firms disappearing because of merger, i.e. the net reduction in the business 
population due to merger; second, in terms of the sum of the sizes of firms disappearing 
into mergers. The measure of firm size used in this study is the capitalization of the 
mergers. 
Table 8 shows the remarkable increase in mergers that occurred in the late 1890s. The 
number of firms absorbed by merger rose from sixty-nine to 303 between 1897 and 
1898, and rose further to 1,208 in 1899. The first important characteristic is that 
consolidation of several firms, rather than piecemeal acquisition, accounted for roughly 
90 percent of all firms disappearances until 1902.48 
The second characteristic is the wide scope of the merger wave. Based on capitalization 
values, the merger movement as a whole seems to have encompassed between one-
fourth and one-half of U.S. industry.49  
                                                                                                                                                                          
47 Thorelli, 294-303. 
48 The distinction between the consolidation form of merger and the acquisition form is in part between 
single and multiple mergers, and in part between all-at-once and one-at-a-tome mergers. A consolidation 
is the more or less simultaneous multiple-union of firms into a consolidated company, an acquisition is 
the taking over of one firm by another, either as an isolated action or as one of extended series. 
Consolidations may represent an attempt to secure a dominating market position directly without lengthy 
competitive war. A series of acquisitions, too, may represent attempts to secure market control, especially 
if legal restrictions or insufficient financial resources prevent consolidation a large number of firms at 
one time. 
49 George Bittlingmayer, “Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Movement?”, Journal of Law & 
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Table 8.  Firm Disappearances by Merger and Merger Capitalizations, 1895-1920 
 
Year 
Firm 
Disappearances by merger
Merger 
Capitalizations 
(millions of dollars) 
1895 43 40.8 
1896 26 24.7 
1897 69 119.7 
1898 303 650.6 
1899 1,208 2,262.7 
1900 340 442.4 
1901 423 2,502.9 
1902 379 910.8 
1903 142 297.6 
1904 79 110.5 
1905 226 243.0 
1906 128 377.8 
1907 87 184.8 
1908 50 187.6 
1909 49 89.1 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Economics 28 (1985), 93. According to another estimate, 318 industrial combinations formed in the years 
1897-1904 controlled 40 percent of U.S. manufacturing capital.  
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1910 142 257.0 
1911 103 210.5 
1912 82 322.4 
1913 85 175.6 
1914 39 159.6 
1915 71 158.4 
1916 117 470.0 
1917 195 678.7 
1918 71 254.2 
1919 171 981.7 
1920 206 1,088.6 
 
Source: Ralph L. Nelson, Merger Movements in American Industry 1895-1956 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1959), 60. 
 
The third characteristic is that mergers were found in almost all major manufacturing 
and mining industries, but a disproportionate share was accounted for by a relatively 
few industries as Table 9 shows. The great majority of merger activity occurred in nine 
industries: food and kindred products, tobacco, chemical and allied products, textile, 
primary metals, metal products, nonelectrical machinery, transportation equipment, and 
bituminous coal mining. The nine industries accounted for 73.1 percent of 1898-1902 
firm disappearance by merger and for 85.8 percent of merger capitalizations. Among 
them, the first four groups- foods, primary metals, metal products, and transportation 
equipment- accounted for 45.1 percent of firm disappearances and 66.7 percent of 
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merger capitalizations. Primary metals alone accounted for 16.1 percent of firm 
disappearances and for 30.2 percent of merger capitalizations. 
 
Table 9.  Distribution of 1898-1902 Merger Activity in Manufacturing and Mining 
                       by Two-Digit Industry Classes 
Industry Firm Disappearances by 
Merger 
Merger Capitalizations 
(millions of dollars) 
Manufacturing 
Ordnance 
Food and kindred products    
Tobacco products 
Textile 
Apparel 
Lumber, wood products 
Furniture, fixtures 
Paper and allied products 
Printing, publishing 
Chemicals 
Petroleum products 
Rubber products 
Leather and products 
Stone, clay, glass products 
Primary metals 
           1 
433 
104 
         76 
          0 
         36 
         24 
        110 
          5 
        178 
         18 
           14 
           22 
          180 
          426 
         10,000 
651,467 
287,487 
        190,671 
             0 
         26,908 
         10,000 
        151,156 
         10,000 
254,266 
         52,000 
          78,501 
          36,000 
         120,850 
        2,829,321 
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Metal products 
Machinery 
Electrical machinery, etc. 
Transportation equipment 
Instruments, optical goods, 
etc. 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 
 
Mining 
Metal mining 
Bitumious coal mining 
Petroleum and gas extraction 
Nonmetallic minerals mining 
Ice, natural and manufactured 
Not allocable 
 
Total manufacturing 
Total mining 
Total manufacturing and 
mining 
          180 
          114 
           18 
          122 
           18 
           51 
           36 
          266 
           38 
           86 
           42 
           34 
2,130 
         443 
2,573 
         281,055 
         330,106 
          55,100 
         368,362 
          18,130 
          54,143 
         133,644 
         178,796 
          40,100 
          26,100 
          73,696 
          51,240 
5,816,623 
        378,640 
6,195,263 
 
Source: Computed from Ralph L. Nelson, Merger Movements in American Industry (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1959), 144-53. 
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The fourth characteristic is that the incorporation of consolidation was concentrated on 
a few states like New Jersey, New York, and Delaware as Table 4-10 indicates. Mergers 
are governed by state corporation laws, which define the conditions under which a 
corporation can secure capital, the lines of business, and its power to hold the stock of 
other corporations. If the corporate charter permits wide latitude in these matters, it will 
be easy for the firm to engage in merger activity. On the contrary, if the charter is strict, 
merger will be difficult or impossible. 
As Table 10 shows, New Jersey dominated overwhelmingly consolidation activity 
during 1895-1904. New York and Delaware rose from a minor fraction merger activity. 
This may suggest the degree to which states changed each corporation laws. 
 
          Table 10.  Consolidation Activity in Leading States, 1895-1904      
(%) 
Percentage of Total Consolidation Activity  
Capitalizations Disappearances Consolidations 
New Jersey 79.1 61.3 50.0 
New York 3.7 5.5 9.7 
Delaware 2.6 1.9 3.8 
Pennsylvania 3.2 9.2 7.2 
West Virginia 0.7 1.7 3.1 
Virginia 0.6 1.9 0.9 
Maine 0.8 1.4 2.8 
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Total Consolidation 
Activity (dollars) 
 
  6,026,580,000 
 
1,184,493,000 
 
313 
 
Source: Constructed from Ralph L. Nelson, Merger Movements in American Industry 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 67. 
 
       b) The success and failure of merger 
 
The basic finding indicated by Table 4-11 is that successful mergers occurred in the 
same type of industries in which the integrated firm had appeared in the 1880s. There 
were fewer mergers and more failures in labor-intensive industries where the 
concentration of production did not significantly reduce costs and where distribution did 
not involve high-volume flows or did not require special service. In the textile group 
where nearly all the mergers failed, only one case was marginally successful. In the 
machinery group, failures dominated in industries that did not require specialized 
services in the selling of products or a complex technology in making them. These 
included mergers for the production of shears, laundry machine, and simple agricultural 
implements such as forks and hoes. 
On the other hand, successful mergers were most numerous in the high-volume, large-
batch or continuous industries and in those needing specialized marketing services. 
These were particularly successful in food and in complex but standardized machines.  
They also numerous in the chemical, stone-glass-clay, and primary metals groups- 
industries in which enterprises used capital-intensive, energy-consuming technologies 
and distributed standardized products to many customers. 
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Table 11 shows that mergers were rarely successful until managerial hierarchies were 
created-that is, until production was consolidated and its administration centralized and 
until the firm had its own marketing and purchasing organizations. As the table 
indicates, the successful firms had integrated. Moreover, the firms which were listed as 
rejuvenated moved from failure to success only after they had changed their strategy 
and structure.50  
During the 1890s mergers had become a standard way of creating large multi-unit 
industrial enterprises. Those formed to control competition or to profit from the process 
of merger itself often brought short-term gains. However, they rarely assured long-term 
profits. Unless the newly formed consolidation used the resources under its control 
more efficiently than had the constituent companies before they joined merger, the 
consolidation had little staying power. Few enjoyed continuing financial success until 
they had followed the example of the pioneering mergers and created an organization 
that was able to coordinate a high-volume flow of materials.  
The experience of the Great Merger Movement provides that few mergers achieved 
long-term profitability until their organizers carried out a strategy to make such 
integration possible. 
 
    Table 11.  The Success and Failure of Mergers 1898-1902 
 
Firms 
 
Classification 
 
Type 
 
Authorized stock 
capital 
(millions of dollars)
                                                          
50 Chandler Jr., 337-39. 
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Mining companies 
Pittsburgh Coal 
 
Food and kindred products 
American Beet Sugar 
American Chicle 
American Fisheries 
American Fruit Products 
American Ice 
American Malting 
Continental Cotton Oil 
Corn Products 
Distilling Co. of America 
Great Western Cereal 
National Biscuit 
National Candy 
Royal Baking Powder 
United Fruit 
U.S. Flour Milling 
(Standard Milling) 
Textile  
American Felt 
American Grass Twine 
 
F 
 
 
M 
S 
F 
F 
S 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
S 
S 
S 
S 
 
R 
 
F 
F 
 
I 
 
 
I 
I 
_ 
_ 
I 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
 
I (Inc.) 
 
_ 
_ 
 
64 
 
 
20 
9 
10 
2 
40 
30 
6 
80 
85 
3 
55 
9 
20 
20 
 
25 
 
5 
15 
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American Thread 
American Woolen 
Mt.Vernon-Woodbury  
New England Cotton Yarn 
U.S. Cotton Duck 
U.S. Finishing 
U.S. Worsted 
Lumber and wood products 
excluding furniture 
American Barrel & Package 
National Casket 
Furniture and fixture 
American School Furniture 
Paper and allied products 
American Writing Paper 
International Paper 
Union Bag and Paper 
U.S. Envelope 
Chemicals 
American Agricultural 
Chemical 
Du Pont 
General Chemical 
M 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
 
 
F 
S 
 
R 
 
F 
M 
M 
S 
 
 
F 
S 
S 
SF 
I 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
 
 
_ 
I 
 
I (Inc.) 
 
I 
I 
I 
_ 
 
 
I 
I 
I 
12 
65 
9.5 
11.5 
50 
3 
36 
 
 
20 
6 
 
10 
 
25 
45 
27 
1.75 
 
 
40 
20 
25 
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National Carbon 
National Salt 
U.S. Dyewood & Extract 
U.S. Glue 
Petroleum refining and 
related products 
Asphalt Co. of America 
National Asphalt 
Pure Oil 
Rubber and miscellaneous 
plastic products 
American Hard Rubber 
Consolidated Rubber Tire 
Leather and its products 
American Hide & Leather 
Stone, clay, and glass 
products 
American Clay Mfg. 
Harbison-Walker 
Refractories 
National Fire Proofing 
National Glass 
U.S. Gypsum 
S 
R 
F 
S 
 
 
F 
F 
S 
 
 
S 
F 
 
F 
 
 
S 
 
S 
M 
F 
S 
I 
I (Inc.) 
_ 
_ (Insuf.) 
 
 
_ 
_ 
I 
 
 
_ (Insuf.) 
_ 
 
I 
 
 
I 
 
I 
I 
_ 
I 
10 
12 
10 
35 
 
 
30 
22 
10 
 
 
2.5 
10 
 
35 
 
 
10 
 
22.25 
3.5 
4 
7.5 
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Primary metal industries 
American Brass 
American Smelting & 
Refining 
American Steel Foundries 
Central Foundry 
International Nickel 
Republic Iron & Steel 
U.S. Cast Iron Pipe 
U.S. Steel 
Fabricated metal products 
except ordnance, machinery, 
and transport equipment 
American Brake Shoe 
American Can 
Machinery 
Allis-Chalmers 
American Fork & Hoe 
American Laundry 
Machinery 
American Pneumatic 
Service 
American Radiator 
 
S 
 
S 
S 
R 
S 
M 
R 
S 
 
 
 
S 
S 
 
R 
F 
 
F 
 
S 
S 
 
SF 
 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
 
 
 
I 
I 
 
I 
_ 
 
_ 
I 
 
I 
 
6 
 
65 
40 
14 
24 
55 
30 
95 
 
 
 
4.5 
88 
 
50 
4 
 
16 
 
15 
10 
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Chicago Pneumatic Tool 
International Harvester 
International Steam Pump 
National Shear 
Otis Elevator 
United Shoe Machinery 
Transportation equipment 
American Bicycle 
American Car & Foundry 
Consolidated Railway 
Lighting & Equipment 
Consolidated Railway 
Lighting & Refrigeration 
International Car Wheel 
International Fire Engine 
Pressed Steel Car 
Pullman 
Railway Steel Spring 
U.S. Shipbuilding 
Miscellaneous 
manufacturers 
Diamond Match 
International Silver 
S 
S 
F 
F 
S 
S 
 
F 
S 
 
F 
 
F 
F 
R 
M 
S 
M 
F 
 
 
S 
S 
I 
I 
I 
_ 
I 
I 
 
_ 
I 
 
_ 
 
_ 
_ 
I 
I 
I (Inc.) 
I 
_ 
 
 
I 
I 
5 
120 
27.5 
3 
11 
25 
 
30 
60 
 
22 
 
16 
15 
9 
25 
74 
20 
45 
 
 
15 
20 
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United Button   F _ 3 
 
Source: Shaw Livermore, “The Success of Industrial Mergers,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
November 1935, 50:68-95 quoted in Alfred Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1978), 340-44.; Hans B. Thorelli, Federal Antitrust Policy 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955) 300-3. 
Note: F represents failure; R indicates rejuvenated company; M means marginal success; and S 
is successful enterprise. 
I indicates integrated; SF indicates single function. (Inc.) means information incomplete but 
enough to suggest type. (Insuf.) means information not sufficient to indicate type. 
The two-digit groups used by the U.S. Bureau of the Census in its Standard Industrial 
Classification. 
 
V.  Theories of Causality on the Great Merger 
Movement 
 
There are many explanations on the cause of the Great Merger Movement, none of 
which commanded general acceptance. The main reason is that the data on mergers 
were inadequate for careful tests. Having no even similar precedent, the wave seemed to 
be historically unique. 
The principal theories on the causes of the Great Merger Movement are as follows; 
retardation of industrial growth; expansion of the national railroad system; the growth 
of the capital market; judicial policy. In the following sections I will review these 
theories and suggest my viewpoint. 
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A.  Retardation of Industrial Growth 
 
   1. Outline 
 
The principal exponent of this thesis is Myron Watkins. According to him, the opening 
of a new and wider market involves pioneering costs which call for the compact 
association of producers. But once a new market has been opened by the joint action of 
the associated producers, its development attracts many producers. The final phase is 
reached when the limit of the expansion of a given market has been touched, and the 
amount and character of its consumption have become settled and known. The gains 
from initiative are no longer sufficient to hold producers upon an independent course 
and they fall in together for their common enrichment at the expense of consumers.51 
Watkins pointed out four causes of the retardation in market growth: closing of the 
frontier, the slackening of population growth, the slowing of technological change, and 
post-1873 secular decline in prices. He had in mind that these various tendencies 
converged at the end of the nineteenth century and set the stage for the merger 
movement.  
In order to prove his theory, he offered examination of specific data on the general 
patterns of industrial growth in the period before 1895, the growth of patterns of 
industries having high merger activity, and the relation of these patterns to the first 
merger wave. What the retardation theory implies is that at the turn of the century 
                                                          
51 Myron Watkins, Industrial Combinations and Public Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
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there was a change in the pattern of industrial growth of sufficient magnitude or 
abruptness to force competitors to band together to alleviate ruinous tendencies of 
falling demand and drastic decline. 
 
   2. Critical review52 
 
The truth of this theory depends upon whether there was a marked increase in general 
retardation just preceding the merger movement and the industries characterized by 
high merger activity were in fact experiencing retardation. In the next sections, I shall 
look to see 
 
      a) General pattern of growth 
 
If retardation was a factor in the Great Merger Movement, there should be appearing at 
least sustained retardation in the period immediately proceeding the merger wave. 
Table 12 includes production series of industries in agriculture and fisheries, mining, 
manufactures and construction, transportation and trade which provide a general 
picture of the pattern of growth. 
The table shows that the two overlapping decades immediately preceding the period of 
merger activity at the turn of the century, 1890-1900 and 1895-1905, saw the 
stabilization or reversal of the pattern of retardation. This appears in the proportion of 
series experiencing an increase at the rate of 10 percent or more per year and also in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1927), 12-3. 
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the proportion of series experiencing a negative rate of increase. During 1890-1900 
years, the proportion of series experiencing a rate of increase of 10 percent or more 
became stabilized. In addition, during 1895-1905, the proportion of the high growth 
rate series was increased sharply. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
52 See Nelson, 71-8. 
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Table 12.  Increases and Decreases in Production Growth Rates, by Overlapping 
Decades, 1870-1930 
Rates of 10 per cent 
and Over 
Rates of 0 or Less  
 
Decade 
 
 
Total Number of 
Series Covered 
Number 
of Series
Percentage 
of series 
covered 
Number 
of series 
Percentage 
of series 
covered 
1870-1880 
1875-1885 
1880-1890 
1885-1895 
1890-1900 
1895-1905 
1900-1910 
1905-1915 
1910-1920 
1915-1925 
1920-1930 
66 
69 
97 
104 
104 
104 
104 
104 
104 
102 
102 
16          24.2 
20          29.0 
17          17.5 
11          10.6 
10           9.6 
21          20.2 
8            7.7 
4            3.8 
9            8.7 
5            4.9 
6            5.9 
6           9.1 
5           7.2 
8           8.2 
10          9.6 
8           7.7 
8           7.7 
11          10.6 
17          16.3 
22          21.3 
43          42.2 
26          25.5 
 
Source: Arthur F. Burns, Production Trends in the United States Since 1870, (New York: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1834), 81. 
 
       
      b) Growth rates in industries of high merger activity 
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Table 13 shows the trend of the growth rate pattern for the forty-four production series 
applicable to the eight industries of greatest merger activity.53 This table reveals that 
the period immediately preceding the intense merger activity beginning in 1898 was 
characterized by acceleration rather than retardation in the growth of the industries of 
high merger activity. In the three overlapping decades 1885-1895, 1890-1900, and 
1895-1905 there were successively larger decades-rates of growth. The proportion of 
series experiencing annual rates of growth of more than 10 percent increased from 9.1 
percent to 31.8 percent of the total number series. The proportion of series 
experiencing a 5.0 to 9.9 percent rate of growth increased from 43.1 percent to 47.7 
percent of the total. The proportion of the total number of series experiencing a less 
than 5 percent rate of growth decreased from 47.8 percent to 20.5 percent of the total. 
 
                                                          
53  Eight industries include food and kindred products, tobacco products, chemicals, 
stone⋅glass⋅nonmetallic minerals, iron and steel mills, nonferrous smelting⋅refining⋅foundries⋅mines, 
transportation equipment, bituminous coal mining, metal products, machinery except electrical, and paper 
and allied products. 
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Table 13.  Annual Growth Rates of Industries with high 1898-1902 
           Relative Merger Activity by Overlapping Decades, 1870-1915 
Percentage of Series by Average Annual 
Growth Rate of Output (%) 
 
 
Decade 
 
Total Number of 
Series Covered  
10 or more 
 
5.0-9.9 
 
0.0-4.9 
Less 
than 0 
1870-1880 
1875-1885 
1880-1890 
1885-1895 
1890-1900 
1895-1905 
1900-1910 
1905-1915 
23 
24 
38 
44 
44 
44 
44 
44 
26.1 
37.5 
18.4 
9.1 
11.4 
31.8 
11.3 
6.8 
43.5 
45.9 
44.7 
43.1 
47.7 
47.7 
41.0 
25.0 
21.7 
8.3 
34.2 
45.5 
41.0 
18.2 
41.0 
59.1 
8.7 
8.3 
2.7 
2.3 
4.5 
2.3 
6.7 
9.1 
 
Source: Ralph L. Nelson, Merger Movements in American Industry, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1959), 76. 
 
Considering statistical numbers, there is no base that the growth of retardation caused 
the Great Merger Movement. Rather, there existed stabilization or increase in growth 
rates for industry in general. In the industries of high merger activity, there was the 
reversal of retardation. 
 
B.  Development of the Railroad System  
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   1. Outline 
 
Joe S. Bain is the principal exponent of theory which the development of railroad 
system incurred the first merger movement at the end of nineteenth century. Most of 
economists buttressed the idea that the railroad was an imperative of economic 
growth.54 They emphasized that there were the impact of the railroad on the growth of 
cities and the high correlation between new railroad construction and both population 
growth and commercial activity. Bain, furthermore, the first merger movement was the 
achievement of building railroads systems at that time. 
According to Bain, competition was intensified by the continuing growth of the 
railroad systems, which tended to bring all of the principal firms together in direct 
competition for a single national market. The economy was passing from a situation 
where a fairy large number of small manufacturers sold their products, each in a 
limited local market somewhat protected by high costs of transportation, to a situation 
where a few large firms vied among themselves for sales in a single market. In the new 
environment, price competition was potentially ruinous to all. 55  In this view, 
                                                          
54 See Leland H. Jenks, “Railroad as an Economic Force in American Development,” The Journal of 
Economic History, IV, No. 1 (1944), 1-20; reprinted in F. C. Lane and J. G. Riesmersma, Enterprise and 
Secular Change (Homewood, 1953), 161-80. Robert Fogel tried a quantitative approach to a casual 
relationship between the development of railroad systems and American economic growth. See Robert W. 
Fogel, “A Quantitative Approach to the Study of Railroads in American Economic Growth: A Report of 
Some Preliminary Findings,” in A. W. Coats & Ross M. Robertson, Essays in American Economic 
History (New York: Barnes and Nobel, 1970), 187-214. 
55 Joe S. Bain, “Industrial Concentration and Government Anti-Trust Policy,” in The Growth of the 
American Economy, H. F. Williamson, ed. (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1944), 710. 
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producers combined to eliminate increasing competition. Through merger, producers 
could avoid ruinous competition and they could stabilize the markets for their products. 
 
   2. Critical review56 
 
Suppose the development of railroad system caused merger, we may expect the 
industries in which the greatest merger activity occurred to have the following 
characteristics: first, the production would be of such nature that per-mile 
transportation costs are fairly large relative to product price. Reduced transportation 
costs would produce a large relative change in delivered price in distant markets, and 
thus provide the stimulus required to induce faraway producers to meet the prices of 
near-by producers. Second, the production of the product would be quite widely 
dispersed. If all producers were located in the same small geographical area, a decline 
in transportation costs would not change the character of the competition; it would 
already be a national market in the sense that all sellers could compete for the 
patronage of all buyers. 
In order to test the validity of the railroad system growth-merger hypothesis, three 
factors must be examined. 
First, it must be determined whether the railroad network expanded and transportation 
costs declined, in the years preceding the first merger movement. If these 
developments did not occur, or if there were only a small growth in transportation, the 
hypothesis would fail for lack of casual factor. 
                                                          
56 See Nelson 80-8. 
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Second, it is necessary to determine the proportion of the merger movement accounted 
for by industries having high-per mile transportation costs relative to the price of the 
product. This provides a rough measure of the proportion of total merger activity that 
could have occurred in response to declines in transportation cost. If this share is 
relatively small, the transportation growth factor can have played only a contributory 
rather than a dominant role in the movement. 
Third, it must be determined whether the industries with high per-mile transportation 
costs relative to product price had widely dispersed producing centers. If these 
industries were concentrated on relatively small geographical areas, then reductions in 
transportation costs would not alter the effective market areas of firms relative to each 
other. 
  
       a) Trends in railroad growth before the Great Merger Movement 
 
The development of the railroad transportation system and the trend in freight rates and 
wholesale prices are described in Table 14. The period 1882-1896 saw a large absolute 
expansion in the railroad system. Miles of track increased from 114,400 to 182,800, 
59.8 percent. Ton-miles of freight carried increased from 39.3 million to 114.1 millions, 
an increase of 190 percent. The cost of freight transportation dropped from 1.236 cents 
per ton- mile in 1882 to 0.806 cents in 1896, a drop of 34.8 percent. 
 
Table 14.  Railroad Mileage, Freight Ton-Miles, Freight Revenue per Ton-Mile, 
                      and Wholesale Prices, 1882-1906 
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Year 
Railroad 
Mileage 
(thousands of 
miles) 
Freight Ton-
Miles 
(millions) 
Freight 
Revenue per 
Ton-Mile 
(cents) 
Wholesale 
Price Index 
(BLS, 
1926=100) 
1882 114.4 39.3 1.236 66.1 
1884 125.1 44.7 1.124 60.5 
1886 133.6 52.8 1.042 56.0 
1888 154.2 65.4 0.977 57.4 
 1890* 163.4  163.6 79.2    76.2 0.927   0.941 56.2 
1892        171.6        88.2        0.898 52.2 
1894        178.7        80.3        0.860 47.9 
1896        182.8        95.3        0.806 46.5 
1898        186.4        114.1        0.753 48.5 
1900        193.3        141.6        0.729 56.1 
1902        202.5        157.3        0.757 58.9 
1904        213.9        174.5        0.780 59.7 
1906        224.4        215.9        0.748 61.8 
 
* The two values for 1890 represent a shift in data sources. For the period 1882-1890 the 
Interstate Commerce Commission compiled railroad statistics from annual issues of Poor’s 
Manual of Railroads. From 1890 forward the data were compiled from the direct reports of 
railroads to the I.C.C.  
Source: Ralph L. Nelson, Merger Movement in American Industry (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1959), 81. 
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      b) Merger activity and transportation costs 
 
In this section, the main contention is whether mergers occurred in industries where 
transportation costs are high, but not prohibitive, relative to the price of the product. 
With a view to demonstrating the incidence of high and low transportation costs 
among industries in which merger activity occurred, the following classification by 
transportation costs has been made: 
1. Industries with a characteristically local market 
2. Industries with low transportation costs relative to price of product 
3. Industries with high transportation costs relative to price of product 
4. Industries for which the role of t costs relative to price of product 
5. Industries for which the role of transportation costs could not be clearly     
     ascertained 
 
The first category, local market industries, includes breweries, firms producing brick, 
sand and gravel, crushed stone, ice, and the like. The extreme weight and bulk of the 
products, and ubiquity of their source materials have restricted their markets to local 
areas despite sharp reductions in transportation costs. 
The second category, industries with national market but low transportation costs, 
contains nonperishable and semi-perishable products like wines, distilled liquors, 
tobacco, and apparel etc.. 
The third category, industries with national markets and high transportation costs, 
includes basic minerals and products of large bulk and weight with a low degree of 
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fabrication. It includes metal mining, meat products, sugar, lumber, and so forth.  
The fourth category, nonallocable, includes nonperishable products of low bulk and 
weight, with a moderate degree of fabrication and highly fabricated but bulky 
products. In this category were also placed those products whose transportation cost 
characteristics were too unclear to allow assignment to another category. 
Table 15 summarizes the breakdown of merger activity by the role if transportation 
costs. The measure of merger activity used is firm disappearances by consolidation 
and acquisition. As the table indicates, a majority of merger occurred in industries in 
which transportation costs were an important factor in delivered price of the product. 
One of 2,546 firm disappearances which could be allocated to a major or minor 
transportation importance category, 1,457, or 57 percent occurred in industries where 
a reduction in transportation costs were important. The remaining 1,089 
disappearances, or 43 percent, occurred in industries where a reduction in 
transportation costs could be expected to have had little effect. In calculations based 
on the consolidation series only, 59 percent of allocable disappearances occurred in 
industries in which transportation costs were important. 
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Table 15.  Merger Activity in Terms of Relative Importance of Transportation 
                    Costs to the Industry, 1895-1904 
 
Firm Disappearances 
Percentage of Total 
Disappearances 
 
 
Transportation costs of - All 
merger 
activity 
 
Consolidations 
only 
All 
merger 
activity 
 
Consolidations 
only 
Major importance 1,457 1,258 48.4 50.5 
Minor importance 
Local Industries 
National industries: low 
  Transportation costs 
 
304 
 
785 
 
289 
 
573 
 
10.1 
 
26.1 
 
11.6 
 
23.0 
Importance not ascertained 
Total 
466 
3,012 
373 
2,493 
15.5 
100.0 
15.0 
100.0 
 
Source: Ralph L. Nelson, Merger Movement in American Industry (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1959) 84. 
 
Even if the proportion of merger activity in which transportation cost reductions may 
have had an effect is sufficiently large, a substantial share of merger activity occurred in 
industries in which transportation cost declines would not have had an appreciable 
effect. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that mergers occurred in high transportation-
cost industries. 
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c) Geographical concentration and merger activity 
 
To determine whether there was negative relationship between merger activity and 
geographical concentration, an indication of the greater geographical concentration of 
high transport-cost industries is provided in Table 16 and a correlation analysis was 
shown in Table 17. 
The geographical concentration of an industry was measured by using the proportion 
of industry wage-earner employment in the three adjoining states of highest 
employment. The industries accounted for 1,676 net disappearances, or 68.5 percent of 
the 2,445 net manufacturing disappearances 1895-1904. Among these industries the 
high transport-cost industries showed higher geographical concentration than either 
low transportation-cost industries or merger industries in general. 
 
Table 16.  Geographical Concentration of Manufacturing among Industries 
  Classified by the Size of Transportation Costs Relative to Product Price, 1895-1904 
Average Index of 
Geographical Concentration 
Transportation Costs 
Relative to Product Price 
 
Number of Industries 
Simple Weighted* 
High 
Low 
Local markets 
Costs not ascertained 
       Total 
10 
6 
2 
5 
23 
 0.510              0.557 
.477               .479 
.312               .293 
.451               .454 
.471               .511 
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* Weighted by net firm disappearances. 
Source: Ralph L. Nelson, Merger Movements in American Industry (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1959), 85. 
 
In addition, it is possible to correlate relative merger activity with geographical 
concentration for twenty two-and three digit industries in Table 17. 
 
Table 17. Relative Merger Activity and Geographical Concentration for Twenty 
                            Industries, 1895-1904 
Relative Merger Activity  
Standard Industrial 
Classification 
All 
merger 
activity 
 
Consolidations 
only 
 
Geographical 
Concentration 
Meat products 
Dairy products 
Canning fruits & 
vegetables 
Grain mill products 
Textiles 
Lumber and furniture 
Paper and allied products 
Printing, publishing 
Industrial organic 
0.294            0.013 
.201            1.38 
.153            .138 
.949            .573 
.136            .135 
.083            .068 
.561            .540 
.031            .026 
 
.061            .041 
0.547 
.290 
.307 
.247 
.543 
.480 
.180 
.455 
.336 
.280 
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chemicals 
Paints 
Fertilizers 
Petroleum 
Leather 
Glass 
Iron and steel 
Farm machinery 
Electrical machinery etc. 
Motor vehicles 
Ship and Boat building 
 
.334            .324 
.953            .746 
.007            .007 
.163            .159 
.402            .398 
2.505 2.311 
 .730             .709 
 .439             .388 
2.190 1.654 
 .342             .328 
.542 
.274 
.365 
.505 
.636 
.688 
.518 
.571 
.507 
.348 
 
Source: Ralph L. Nelson, Merger Movements in American Industry (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1959), 86. 
 
According to table, a moderate degree of positive relationship existed between the 
merger activity of an industry and its geographical concentration, which suggests that 
less intensive merger activity occurred in industries in which producing centers were 
widely dispersed. 
 
To be brief, the findings from discussion are that first, the expansion of railroad system 
occurred in the years preceding the first merger movement and there existed a 
substantial decline in the relative cost of transportation. In addition, a considerable part 
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of total 1895-1904 merger activity in manufacturing and mining took place in those 
industries in which transportation costs were large relative to the price of the product. 
Finally, the geographical concentration of higher transport cost industries was higher 
than that for low-transport cost industries, suggesting that there were few geographical 
barriers to be broken down by transportation cost reductions.  
Therefore, at least, the high proportion of merger activity occurring in industries with 
high transport costs was not due to reductions in these costs. Accordingly, the main 
logic of exponents of this theory is broken. There does not exists a significant casual 
relationship between the development of railroad system and the Great Merger 
Movement. 
 
C.  Development of Capital Market 
 
   1. Outline 
 
George Stigler argues that the only persuasive reason for the Great Merger Movement 
is the development of modern corporation and the modern capital market.57 According 
to Stigler, in a regime of individual proprietorships and partnerships, the capital 
requirement were a major obstacle to buying up the firms in an industry and unlimited 
liability was a major obstacle to the formation of partnerships. The power of early 
corporations were severely limited and then they could not hold stock in other 
corporations. For example, they could not merge with another corporation and they 
                                                          
57 Stigler, 101. 
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often could not do business outside the state of incorporation.  
Under these environments, New Jersey initiated the competition corporations, which in 
twenty years eliminated almost every restriction on mergers. In this same period the 
New York Stock Exchange developed into an effective market for industrial securities. 
Stigler argues that these institutional changes are causes for the development of the 
Great Merger Movement.  
 
   2. Critical review 
 
Looking at corporation law and capital market as causes raises some questions. 
First, the role of the new corporation laws is less than clear. New Jersey allowed 
holding companies and permitted corporations to exchange stock for property in 1889, 
nine years before the merger wave began. 58  Other states soon passed similar 
legislation. As early as New York adopted a provision legalizing corporation 
stockholding in her incorporation law and reduced requirements of publicity in 
corporate operations. The states of Delaware, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Maine and 
West Virginia soon became conspicuous for the lax legislation. However, the year 
Delaware made new corporate law was in 1899 and the year Maine did was in 1901. 
                                                          
58 Bittlingmayer,108. The original text of Laws of the State of New Jersey, 1889, c.265, sec4 is as 
follows: 
That the directors of any company incorporated under this act may purchase mines, manufactories or 
other property necessary for their business, or the stock of any company or companies owning, mining, 
manufacturing or producing materials, or other property necessary for their business, and issue stock to 
the amount of the value thereof in payment thereof, and the stock so issued shall be declared and be taken 
to be full-paid stock… 
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The Great Merger Movement was already proceeding at that time. Even if we admit 
New jersey retained her leadership in this field, the explanation of Stigler that 
corporate law caused the Great Merger Movement is not persuasive enough. 
Second, corporations could consolidate even before 1889 with special permission of 
stated of legislatures if it hoped to do so. Moreover, they could purchase property and 
some conducted sub rosa holding company relations. In addition, the holding company 
played a role only after the merger wave got underway. According to Lewis Haney, 
just prior to the great holding company epoch which began in 1899 and reached its 
climax between that date and 1904, a number of consolidations of different type arose-
complete consolidation.59 
Third, it is difficult to say determinately that the stock market caused the first merger 
movement. Rather, the causation may be opposite direction. According to Ralph 
Nelson, from the years following the Civil War until the mid-1890’s the number of 
stock issues listed rose almost continuously. This period was followed by the extensive 
railroad reorganizations of the 1890’s, largely under the leadership of J.P. 
Morgan.60However, there was no marked increase in the number of listed issues in the 
1890s, although the number of shares traded increased about threefold from 1896 to 
1899. 
Considering these points, it seems likely that the development of capital market was 
more the beneficiaries of the deepening of the market than its cause. 
                                                          
59 Lewis Haney, Business Organization and Combination (New York: Macmillian, 1913), 238 quoted in 
Bittlingmayer, 109. 
60 E. G. Campbell, The Reorganization of the American Railroad System, 1893-1900 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1938) quoted in Nelson, 90-1. 
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D.  Suggested Theory 
 
Under Common Law system like United States the influence of ruling by the Supreme 
Court is more considerable than that of ruling under Continental Law system. Moreover, 
it is not difficult to surmise that ruling by court affected merger trends in certain parts, 
considering the Sherman Act did not play role in the late nineteen centuries and had 
shortcomings. In the following sections, I shall review whether judicial policy affected 
the Great Merger Movement 
 
    1. Judicial Policy and the Great Merger Movement 
 
      a) Climate of the Supreme Court around the Great Merger Movement 
 
The rate of turnover on the Supreme Court was unusually high around the year 1890. As 
from 1888 and including 1895, eight new justices took their seats on the bench. These 
were Chief Justice Fuller (1888) and Justices Lamar (1888), Brewer (1889), Brown 
(1890), Shiras (1892), Jackson (1893), White (1895) and Peckham (1895). Justice 
Mackenna was appointed in 1898, Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1902 and William R. Day 
in 1903. 
Though turnover rate of the Supreme Court was high, the general doctrine dominated 
the Supreme Court during around 1890s and the Great Merger Movement was laissez 
faire. While it is true that laissez faire lost somewhat in popularity even in the early 
1890’s, it still dominated the Supreme Court. Not until the turn of the century did 
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opposition to laissez faire gain substantial ground. Edward S. Cowin pointed out that 
laissez faire mingled with “ a compound of teachings of the Manchester school of 
political economy and a highly sentimentalized version of the doctrine of evolution.61 
However, there were other ingredients of doctrine, that is, traditional fears of expanding 
government powers, individualism, and the oft-mentioned classical American belief in 
“inevitable progress”. These all mingled with elements of judicial conservatism.62 
 
       b) Evolution of judicial policy 
 
As the first effort to control the economy at large, the Sherman Act posed special 
problems for judges. In some instances, antitrust cases called for a fuller understanding 
of monopolistic and competitive behavior than economic theory could offer. However, 
the greatest difficulty, especially pressing through the early years, was not so much to 
determine the facts of a case as to discover the meaning of the statute. 
When the Sherman Act was tested in 1895 in E. C. Knight, a suit the federal 
government brought against the American Sugar Refining Company, the Supreme 
                                                          
61 Edward S. Cowin, The Twilight of the Supreme Court (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), 48. 
62 Most of the relevant elements of the philosophy embraced by a majority of the Supreme Court seem to 
underlie Justice Peckham’s famous definition of the term “liberty” in the 14th Amendment in a well-
known decision handed down in 1897: 
The liberty mentioned in that amendment means not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere 
physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the 
citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and 
work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation; 
and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his 
carrying out to a successful conclusion the purpose above mentioned. 
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Court upheld a consolidation involving the notorious Sugar Trust. This was viewed as 
a setback for antitrust policy and one widespread interpretation of Knight was that 
merger was legal.63 A firestorm of indignation, including a dozen new state laws, 
followed Knight. The state legislation may also have resulted from the impression the 
Court gave that it was up to the states to do something about monopoly.64 
The first cartel case to reach the Supreme Court, Trans-Missouri, was decided in 
March of 1897. The Court held that the merger was illegal. Then the Supreme Court in 
the Joint Traffic case (involving the Eastern Trunk Line Association) and in 1899 in 
the Addystion Pipe and Steel case, ruled clearly and precisely that any combination of 
business firms formed to fix prices or allocate markets violated the Sherman Act.  
 
       c) Principal antitrust cases 
 
The key court decisions with regard to antitrust policy around the Great Merger 
Movement include E. C. Knight, Trans-Missouri, Joint Traffic, and Addyston cases. In 
the following section, I shall review these cases. 
 
   (1) United States v. E. C. Knight Co. et al. (1895)65 
 
This was the first Sherman Act case to reach the Supreme Court and was involved in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
63 See Richard A. Posner & Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co, 1981), 
36-8. 
64 Bittlingmayer, 87-9. 
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the Sugar Trust. The government’s action in equity was begun in the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania. The bill set forth that the American Sugar Refining Company (of 
New Jersey), which had been producing about 65 percent of all the sugar refined in the  
United States, had purchased the entire stock of the E. C. Knight Company and three 
other Pennsylvania corporations by agreements with the comparisons and their 
stockholders. 
These four companies, operating refineries in Philadelphia, were responsible for an 
additional 33 percent of all the sugar produced in the country. As very little refined 
sugar was imported into the United States, these transactions served to give the trust 
almost complete control of the sugar industry and trade. The American Sugar Refining 
Company had paid for the stock acquired with parts of its own stock especially issued 
for that purpose. The government claimed that these facts constituted a violation of 
section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.  
In 1895 Chief Justice Fuller affirmed the decision of the lower courts which followed 
that the contract and act could not be prohibited by a Federal statute. Fuller insisted 
that the suit turned solely on whether the contracts to buy up competitors were valid. It 
did not matter, Fuller said, whether monopoly meant only a privilege granted by the 
state or a power acquired by the private efforts of individuals. It did not matter whether 
the case involved a combination.  
Some scholars criticized this ruling and the influence of this case was considerable as 
Jesse Markham emphasized.66 
                                                                                                                                                                          
65 United States v. E. C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1898). 
66 On the criticism of the ruling of Knight case, see Letwin, 161-7 and Jesse W. Markham, Survey of the 
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   (2) United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association et al. (1897)67 
 
This was a bill in equity filed by the United States in 1892 against the Trans Missouri 
Freight Association and its fifteen member railroad companies handling a substantial 
part of the traffic west of he Missouri River. The bill alleged a combination, 
institutionalized as the Freight Association, formed for the purpose of fixing uniform 
rates and regulations for nearly all freight handled by participating roads. A decree 
was requested to dissolve the association and to enjoin the companies from performing 
the underlying or any other agreement among them violating Section 1 and/or 2 of the 
Sherman Act. Defendants denied the effect of “suppressed” competition. 
The Supreme Court held that it would not necessarily or probably “suppressed” 
competition and at the same time, the price was not reasonable. Also, all restraint of 
trade was illegal in terms of the Sherman Act and there was no exception. 
 
  (3) United States v. Joint Traffic Association (1898)68 
 
A bill was filed in 1896 against the Joint Traffic Association, composed of thirty-odd 
railroads engaged in interstate transportation between the Atlantic seaboard on the one 
hand and Chicago and the Mississippi valley on the other. The government requested 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Evidence and Findings on Mergers in Business Concentration and Price Policy: A Report of the National 
Bureau of Economic Research, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), 166.  
67 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). 
68 United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U.S. 505 (1898). 
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an injunction restraining the association form carrying into effect an agreement 
between the participating railroads to establish rates and regulations by joint action 
and aiming at proportionalizing the traffic between the roads. The government claimed 
that the contract violated the Interstate Commerce Act as well as Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. 
The Circuit Court dismissed the petition on 1896 and this decree was affirmed by the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on 1897. The Supreme Court reversed the 
decree of dismissal on October 24, 1898. 
Defendants attempted to show that the rates established under the agreement must be 
reasonable. The argument was that the basis of these rates was the schedule of fares 
filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission before the agreement went into effect. 
The Court said that all restraint of trade was not per se illegal, since the restraint to 
boost business was legal and the Sherman Act prohibited the restrain of interstate trade 
which suppressed directly and effectively competition. This agreement among railroad 
companies should be regarded as restraining trade. 
      (4) United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. et al. (1899)69 
 
The government filed against the Addyston Pipe and Steel Company and five other 
corporations constituting the “Associated Pipe Works.” Based on Sections 1 and 2 of 
the Sherman Act, the government alleged a conspiracy to enhance prices by 
eliminating competition in the sale of cast-iron pipe in interstate commerce. The 
principal prayer of the government was that a decree should be entered dissolving the 
                                                          
69 United States v. Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. 211, 240 (1899)  
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conspiracy of defendants and enjoining them form operating under it. 
At that time, defendants dominated the manufacture and distribution of cast-iron pipe 
in at least thirty states and territories. All in all, defendant’s aggregate capacity 
amounted to about one-third of the total tonnage capacity in the country. 
The thirty-six states and territories of special interest to defendants were referred to by 
them as “pay” territory, while remaining areas of the country were called “free” 
territory, in which defendants were at liberty to make sales without restriction. In the 
“pay” territory defendants after 1894 operated under a somewhat complicated bonus 
plan. As of June, 1895 the price of each contract in the “pay” territory was fixed in 
advance by the association. Thereafter an auction pool was established. 
Taft, Circuit Judge, raised two questions: First, was the association of the defendants a 
contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade, as the terms are to be 
understood in the act? Second. Was the trade thus restrained trade between the states? 
Taft said that a part of the plan was a deliberate attempt to create in the minds of the 
members of the public inviting bids the belief that competition existed between the 
defendants. Several of the defendants were required to bid at every letting, and to 
make their bids at such prices that the one already selected to obtain the contract 
should have the lowest bid. It is well settled that an agreement between intending 
bidders at a public auction or a public letting not to bid against each other, and thus to 
prevent competition, is a fraud upon the intending vendor or contractor, and the 
ensuing sale or contract will be set aside…No matter what the excuse for the 
combination by defendants in restraint of trade, the illegality of the means stamps it as 
a conspiracy, and so brings it within that term of the federal statute. 
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   2. Relationship between key antitrust decision and merger activity70 
 
Table 18 shows quarterly merger figures and some key antitrust history for the years 
1895-1900. Bold-face numbers present where the quarterly merger figures reached a 
new high (beginning with the third quarter of 1895). 
E. C. Knight was followed by three successive quarters of increased merger activity, 
consistent with the view that it did signal that merger was legal under the Sherman Act. 
Only twelve firm disappearances occurred between this mini-wave and the first quarter 
of 1897, when Trans-Missouri was announced and many state antitrust laws were 
passed. After a one-quarter lull, merger activity increased to unprecedented levels, 
then decreased just before the Addyston appears decision, only, to increase when the 
decision was announced. After another one quarter lull, merger activity increased 
steadily until early 1899 and remained above pre-1897 levels until the end of 1900. 
However, as the lags could be variable and the cases are only a proxy for actual 
expected policy, we cannot say this data proves directly judicial policy caused merger 
activity. Interpretations of court doctrine by prominent authorities, initiatives to amend 
legislation, and declarations of war are all factors that could make mergers occur one 
or two quarters sooner or later. In the face of this possibility, another fact showed in 
the next section also proves the causality between judicial policy and the Great Merger 
Movement. 
 
Table 18.  Quarterly Merger Statistics and Antitrust Policy, 1895-1890 
                                                          
70 Bittlingmayer, 97-102. 
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Year and Quarter 
Manufacturing 
Merger 
Capitalizations 
(millions of dollars)
 
Quarterly Firm 
disappearances 
 
 
Events 
1895: I 
     II 
     III 
     IV 
1896: I 
     II 
     III 
     IV 
1897: I 
     II 
     III 
     IV 
1898: I 
     II 
     III 
     IV 
1899: I 
     II 
     III 
1.0 
10.4 
14.5 
.6 
6.1 
4.5 
0 
1.3 
10.0 
0 
81.6 
10.3 
167.6 
44.7 
209.3 
212.3 
862.4 
522.4 
373.4 
3 
14 
24 
1 
3 
7 
0 
1 
8 
0 
38 
17 
132 
64 
19 
76 
410 
271 
316 
E.C. Knight 
 
 
 
 
 
Election of campaign 
of 1896 
State Law and Trans-
Missouri 
 
 
Addyston (Appeals 
Court) 
 
Joint Traffic 
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     IV 
1900: I 
     II 
     III 
     IV 
 
112.9 
149.9 
126.9 
98.3 
11.8 
128 
147 
55 
60 
53 
Addyston (Supreme 
Court) 
 
Source: Ralph L. Nelson, Merger Movements in American Industry (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1959), 139; George Bittlingmayer, “Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great 
Merger Movement?”, Journal of Law & Economics 28 (1985), 98. 
 
    3. Review industries 
 
In this section, example industries provide merger activity followed court key 
decisions. 
 
       (1) Railroading 
 
Railroading provides instanced in which production is carried out with substantial 
fixed expenses, and in which the relevant market (transportation between two points) 
frequently has few competitors. In addition, railroad cartel were the focus of the first 
two significant cartel cases to reach the Supreme Court. 
Railroad had passed through trying times in the early and mid-1890s. Even if some 
railroad consolidations had been undertaken in the mid-1890s, their number increased 
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sharply after the Trans-Missouri and joint Traffic decisions. This is evident in the data 
on mergers for twelve-month periods ending in June that are presented in Table 19. 
Mergers increased substantially in 1897, following Trans-Missouri, and declined while 
Joint Traffic wound its way to the Supreme Court. This case was decided in October of 
1898, and mergers and consolidations increased for the period July 1898-1899. Over 
the next twelve months, ending June 1900, mergers increased to a new high. 
The effect of these mergers is also reflected in the growth of class 1 railroads-those 
with 1,00 miles or more of track, also shown in Table 19. The number of class 1 
railroads increased from forty-four to fifty-one (or 16 percent) between June 1899 and 
June 1902. In addition, the larger 23 percent increase in class 1 mileage suggests that a 
good deal of the overall growth came from existing class 1 roads. The percentage of 
railroad mileage under class 1 control increased from 57 percent in 1899 to 65 percent 
in 1902. 
These developments are consistent with the view that the Supreme Court drove 
railroads to other forms of joint control, although not always merger. However, there 
seem to be two factors that offset the influence of the 1897 and 1898 decisions. The 
prohibition of pooling and the erosion of Interstate Commerce Commission powers in 
the early 1890s probably stimulated some consolidations among railroads even before 
these court decisions were made. Consistent with this, Table 19 shows that an annual 
average of about 2 percent of U.S. mileage was merged or consolidated over the years 
1890-96. However, serious legislative efforts were made to permit pooling and to 
reform the regulation of railroads in other ways in the late 1890s and ensuing years. 
The overall effect of these two influences was probably to soften the impact of the two 
railroad cases. 
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 Table 19.  Railroad Mergers, Consolidations, Number, and Mileage of Class 1 
                          Railroads, 1890-1907 
    
Merged 
 
Consolidated 
 
 
Year 
 
Number 
 
Miles 
 
Number
 
Miles
Number of 
Class 1 
Railroads
Mileage of 
Class 1 
Railroads 
Percentage 
of Total 
Mileage 
1890 
1891 
1892 
1893 
1894 
1895 
1896 
1897 
1898 
1899 
1900 
1901 
1902 
1903 
1904 
1905 
1906 
1907 
13 
35 
19 
28 
15 
9 
22 
57 
22 
42 
89 
55 
62 
66 
47 
30 
28 
20 
599 
4,436 
1,143 
750 
1,735 
1,986 
1,505 
3,180 
1,234 
1,938 
4,490 
3,827 
2,228 
4,762 
3,046 
1,218 
1,274 
996 
50 
39 
16 
16 
14 
28 
18 
19 
14 
20 
36 
28 
46 
28 
32 
22 
24 
25 
6,196
3,184
323 
1,496
1,590
1,591
718 
1,197
1,310
713 
5,762
3,080
2,628
4,930
1,913
1,438
2,157
1,740
40 
41 
43 
43 
44 
44 
44 
44 
44 
44 
49 
48 
51 
50 
48 
49 
50 
51 
77,873 
94,265 
99,232 
98,386 
100,547 
100,715 
103,346 
103,566 
105,372 
109,405 
117,880 
127,489 
134,090 
139,858 
143,952 
147,299 
150,927 
155,101 
47.5 
56.0 
57.9 
55.8 
56.3 
55.7 
56.9 
56.3 
56.6 
56.3 
59.2 
63.0 
64.7 
65.5 
65.4 
65.4 
65.4 
65.5 
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Source: Bittlingmayer, “Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Movement?” Journal of 
Law & Economics 28 (1985), 101. 
     
        (2) Iron and Steel 
 
Cartel agreements in iron and steel existed in pig iron, steel billets, steel rails, structural 
steel, steel plate, nails and wire, and numerous other products. U.S. Steel was formed in 
1901 as a holding company organized under the laws of New Jersey. Its three major 
components were the three largest iron and steel producers in the United States. U.S. 
Steel also assumed control of a number of producers of finished goods that dominated 
their fields. It absorbed substantial transportation and mining facilities that had 
previously been independent firms. 
In turn, two of the major steel companies that became part of U.S. Steel, Federal and 
National Steel, were themselves formed through mergers in 1898, as were many of the 
producers of finished products. For example, the American Steel and Wire Company 
was organized in April of 1898 out of fourteen mills, and the successor consolidation, 
with twenty-nine plants in 1900, owned nearly every wire, wire rod, and wire nail plant 
in the United States. The Wire Nail Association had cartelized this industry in the mid-
1890s. 
The connection between price fixing and merger in the steel industry probably be 
explored at greater length, but the major developments in this industry certainly make it 
reasonable to infer that merger performed some of the function of the abandoned cartels. 
The mergers also occurred at just the right time to raise the suspicion that they were a 
response to legal developments. In addition, iron and steel provides a classic industry 
                                          99
where production takes place under fixed costs and where transportation costs were 
probably high enough to create regional markets with small numbers of competitors.71 
                                                          
71 George Bittlingmayer, “Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at the Addyston Pipe 
Case,” Journal of Law & Economics 51(1982), 70-2. 
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VI.  Conclusion 
 
According to my research on causality of the Great Merger Movement, retardation of 
industrial growth, development of railroad system, and growth of capital market are 
proved not directly to be related to the Great Merger Movement. Rather, the research 
based upon statistical data proves that judicial policy incurred the Great Merger 
Movement.  
However, it is difficult to conclude that only judicial policy affected the Great Merger 
Movement. The influence of judicial policy, I believe, is relatively reasonable factor of 
some causes contended. In addition, I do not exclude other cause might exist. 
Therefore, there are a few limitations of my study: First, I do not consider the “third” 
hidden causes. If the “third” cause may exist, it will be also difficult to determine what 
cause were the most influential. Second, the two industries, railroading, and iron and 
steel, presented as evidences are too small cases to prove the causality between judicial 
policy and the Great Merger Movement. However, according to Posner’s study, there is 
a strong statistical relationship between them during the years 1904 to 1920 and more 
casual investigation suggests that the merger wave of the late 1920s may have been 
related to increased case filings and reestablishment of the per se rule.72 
Through the Great Merger Movement, the Big Business influenced substantially 
American society. 
First, firms set up innovation, mass production system, active investment, and efficient 
                                                          
72 See Richard A. Posner, “A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement,” Journal of Law & Economics 
13 (1970), 365-417. 
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organization during turn of nineteen century. Innovative firms or activity of 
entrepreneur was imitated by other firms or entrepreneur and then innovation of firms 
was generalized through imitation process. American enterprises developed sharply 
through economy of scales following the Great Merger Movement and at the same time, 
capitalism of the United States also developed dynamically.73 
Each side-effect like distortion of market economy incurred during this development 
process was improved by fair enforcement of the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. I 
believe that recent economic boom in the United States is based upon the stable 
foundations constructed from the Great Merger Movement. In fact, during economic 
construction from the Great Merger Movement, we cannot overestimate the effort and 
performance of the Supreme Court of the United States to create “new norm” through 
historic rulings. 
Considering substantial increase of M&A in Korea and “Big Deal” issues, we, I believe, 
can get the lessons and implications from the Great Merger Movement.  
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